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Chapter 1
The Early Republic and The Right to Privacy
Since before the founding of the United States, privacy concerns have earned significant
political attention and sparked debate over proper legal protections. Concerns of government
overreach into the private sphere first surfaced during the colonial period, when the British
government issued court orders called “general warrants” and “writs of assistance.”1 These
orders gave British customs officers the power to conduct non-specific searches of colonists’
workplaces and homes for untaxed goods. This practice galvanized political resistance to
arbitrary searches during the 18th century and formed the basis for one of the most sacred
protections in the American Constitution, the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”2
The Fourth Amendment was conceived during a time when abuses of privacy were
initiated through the entering of a home, the physical search of a person, or the seizure of their
belongings. The Framers did not imagine the scope of this right needed to be broader. However,
by the end of the 19th century, scholars were already taking note of the Fourth Amendment’s
shortcomings. Most notably, legal scholars Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren questioned the
extent to which privacy would be protected by the Fourth Amendment in the face of modern
technologies. In their esteemed Harvard Law Review article, titled “The Right to Privacy,”

Orin Kerr and Barry Friedman, “Interpretation: The Fourth Amendment,” National Constitution Center, accessed
October 10, 2021, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-iv/interps/121.
2
“The 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,” National Constitution Center, accessed September 30, 2021,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-iv.
1
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Brandeis and Warren suggested that a right to privacy is embedded in American common law.
This right, they argued, is one that responds to the evolving needs of society.
Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society…Gradually the
scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the
right to enjoy life, – to be let alone…and the term “property” has grown to comprise
every form of possession – intangible, as well as tangible.3

Although their article provides a direct response to privacy concerns triggered by the
advent of cameras and celebrity journalism, the sentiment in “The Right to Privacy” fits well into
our modern context. Today, we live in a world known as the digital age. Every piece of
information, from our contacts to our health records, exists in a digital form, accessible to anyone
with a phone password or subpoena. In our hyper-digitalized society, where the information
capacity of computers and cellphones so greatly outweighs those of 18th century “papers and
effects,” the initial scope of the Fourth Amendment is insufficient. As Warren and Brandeis
argued in “The Right to Privacy,” new technologies necessitate new conceptions of privacy, and,
with them, require enhanced protections. Forty years later, after joining the Supreme Court,
Justice Brandeis would dissent in the case Olmstead v. United States. There he echoed a similar
sentiment, once again advocating for a substantial right to privacy, sufficient for the modern age:
“Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury
the most intimate occurrences of the home.”4
For over a century, justices and legal scholars have recognized Justice Brandeis’
forewarning to be true. The language of the Fourth Amendment is inadequate to safeguard

Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890): 193–220,
193. https://doi.org/10.2307/1321160.
4
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3
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privacy in the face of new technologies, and consistently requires reconsideration. In an effort to
reconcile the language of the Fourth Amendment and increasing privacy concerns, the Supreme
Court has grappled with adjusting the scope of the Amendment to ensure that the proper balance
between state power and individual privacy endures. This has resulted in a century-long line of
case law that has answered some questions, but left open many more regarding how modern
technologies, both current and future, will fit into the standing legal framework. In this chapter, I
explore some of the most consequential developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the
digital age, highlighting the continued challenge the Court faces as it attempts to balance
government interest in police surveillance and privacy concerns among the American people.

The Digital Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court

The first Supreme Court case to dictate the trajectory of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was Olmstead v. United States. In this case, Roy Olmstead was suspected of
running a large-scale bootlegging operation during Prohibition. Upon suspicion, federal
prohibition officers wiretapped phone lines that connected from the chief office of the operation
to the homes of several conspirators. The wiretapping intercepted phone lines in the basement of
the office and on the streets outside the residences of the petitioners. Over several months, the
federal officers gathered evidence from phone calls made between Olmstead and other coconspirators, revealing information about large liquor importations and other business
transactions. The wiretapping implicated not only the petitioners in the case, but seventy-two
other individuals who were part of the illegal operation.5

5

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
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Following their convictions of conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act, Olmstead and
the other defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. They challenged their convictions on the
grounds that the wiretapping of phone calls, absent a warrant, violated both their Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights. Ultimately, a majority of the Court, including Chief Justice Taft, found
Olmstead’s argument unconvincing. The Court rejected the premise that a Fourth Amendment
search could occur outside the strictly defined realm of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” In
fact, the opinion of the Court suggested that to consider wiretapping a Fourth Amendment
search, and hold the evidence to be inadmissible, would be “attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning to the Fourth Amendment.”6
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Taft adhered to the traditional common law
physical trespass doctrine. This doctrine states that a Fourth Amendment search takes place only
when “seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure” occur.7
In this view, the Court argued that since the wiretapping did not implicate the homes or tangible
effects of the petitioners, a Fourth Amendment search had not occurred. Thus, the evidence
obtained through the wiretapping was permissible. Olmstead and his co-conspirators’
convictions stood, and the Court solidified the common law physical trespass doctrine in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. This decision stood until the landmark case of Katz v. United States.
In 1967, the Court was again faced with the challenge of applying the Fourth Amendment to a
new context. This time, the Court abandoned the physical trespass doctrine for a more liberal
Fourth Amendment test: a reasonable expectation of privacy.8

6

Id. at 438.
Id. at 466.
8
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7
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In the case of Katz v. United States, petitioner Charles Katz challenged his conviction of
transmitting betting information across state lines. Katz, who had been placing illegal bets from
California to Boston and Miami, argued that his Fourth Amendment right was violated in the
gathering of evidence against him. Federal law enforcement agents had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to a public phone booth where Katz made his calls. The agents
used this device without a warrant. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Katz, finding the
eavesdropping of Katz's phone calls by the government a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Stewart, demonstrated a significant legal
departure from the arguments made in Olmstead. While a majority of justices in Olmstead
declined to recognize phone calls as deserving of Fourth Amendment protections, the majority in
Katz took the opposite approach. In his opinion, Justice Stewart argues that the Fourth
Amendment must provide protection for oral statements, not just tangible items.9 Furthermore,
Justice Stewart rejected the government’s argument that the visibility and public nature of the
phone booth precluded statements uttered within it from receiving constitutional protection.
Justice Stewart reasoned:
But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it
was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls
from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a
friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come
to play in private communication.10

9

Id. at 353.
Id. at 352.

10
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Justice Stewart’s opinion was monumental in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
holding that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections in a public phone booth,
because this was an area in which constitutional protection of private phone calls extended, the
Court effectively adopted a new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. This new interpretation
looked beyond the narrow language of the Fourth Amendment, to consider how modern
technology changed expectations of privacy. The physical trespass doctrine would no longer
control Fourth Amendment cases. Instead, the Court would apply the Fourth Amendment with
the understanding that it protects “people – and not simply areas.”11
In his famous concurring opinion, Justice Harlan took the Katz decision a step further. He
concluded that, through the Court’s analysis of Katz’s right to privacy in calls made from a
public phone booth, the Court had paved a new path in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
fact, he asserted that the Court created an entirely new test to assess Fourth Amendment cases:
the reasonable expectation of privacy test.12 This new framework required that two features be
met. Justice Harlan detailed: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."”13 Ultimately, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion has been incredibly influential
as it elucidated the new Katz privacy test, which is still discussed in Fourth Amendment cases
today.14
In 1976, less than a decade after Katz, the Supreme Court decided a case that
significantly altered Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test. This case, United

11

Id. at 353.
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14
Nicandro Iannacci, “Katz v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Adapts to New Technology,” National
Constitution Center, accessed September 28, 2021, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/katz-v-united-states-thefourth-amendment-adapts-to-new-technology.
12
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States v. Miller, involved a man who was investigated for committing tax fraud. Unaccompanied
by a warrant, police officers presented subpoenas to the presidents of two banks, requesting
copies of Miller’s bank records. The records were obtained and used to convict Miller. When the
case reached the Supreme Court, Miller argued that the evidence gathered from the bank records
should be dismissed because the government had conducted an unlawful Fourth Amendment
search. Relying on Katz, Miller argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
copies of his personal records held by the banks. This case forced the Court to consider a new
type of Fourth Amendment question, this time involving a third party.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Miller’s Fourth Amendment rights had not been
violated. The opinion, authored by Justice Powell, reasoned that it was not Miller’s “private
papers” which had been seized, but transactional records belonging to the banks.15 Furthermore,
because Miller had voluntarily conveyed his personal information to the banks, his records were
no longer subject to constitutional protection.
The Court’s opinion in United States v. Miller established what has proven to be an
extremely consequential Fourth Amendment loophole, the third-party doctrine. This new
constitutional principle carved out an exception to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test, restricting information voluntarily shared with a third-party entity from receiving Fourth
Amendment protection. Crucially, the third-party doctrine enables the government to access
personal information disclosed to the third parties without a warrant, regardless of the
defendant’s expectation that their information be used for “limited purposes.”16
The Court’s creation of the third-party doctrine demonstrated a significant departure from
previous Fourth Amendment rules which stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy justified

15
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United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
Id. at 443.
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Fourth Amendment protection. Here, the Court decided to tip the scale in favor of limiting
privacy protections, rather than expanding them, as it had in Katz. Justice Brennan disagreed
with the Court’s narrowing of protections for information shared to third parties. He argued: “For
all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a
bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”17 Justice Brennan criticized the
majority’s finding that the voluntary nature of the bank records rendered them undeserving of
constitutional protection. He suggests that this argument ignores the realities of modern society,
as it forces individuals to forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights by engaging with a necessary
aspect of economic life.
Three years later, in the case of Smith v. Maryland, the Court applied the third-party
doctrine to a new set of facts. In this case, the Court held that the installation of a pen register,
used to trace phone numbers dialed from the petitioner’s home phone, was not a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Blackmun, presented
reasoning analogous to Miller. Justice Blackmun argued that Smith did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to the phone numbers he dialed, as he was voluntarily accepting the risks
of disseminating private information.
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to
the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information;
and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically
gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances,
harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.18

17
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Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
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Smith had failed to convince the Court of his subjective expectation of privacy in his
dialed phone numbers. Crucially, Justice Blackmun denied Smith’s claim of an expectation of
privacy in his dialed phone number because, unlike the recording device in Katz, the pen register
here did not capture “contents of communications.”19 The Court reasoned that, although the
substance of a phone call is subject to constitutional protection, the recording of dialed phone
numbers is not. Furthermore, the Court declined to recognize this privacy expectation as
generally “legitimate.”20 Instead, the Court applied the third-party doctrine, asserting that
individuals accept the risk of their information being turned over to the government by
subscribing to a phone company in the first place. Thus, the Court solidified that a warrant would
not be required to access non-content-based communication shared with a third-party entity.
Like the Miller case, a few of the Justices did not look favorably upon this decision. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall echoed the sentiment of Justice Brennan in Miller. First,
he took issue with the Court’s assertion that subscribing to a phone company requires users to
forfeit their Fourth Amendment right in the numbers they dial.
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice...By contrast here,
unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or
professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to
speak of "assuming" risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no
realistic alternative.”21

Just as Justice Brennan had argued the use of a bank had become an indispensable part of
economic life by the mid 1970s, Justice Marshall found the same to be true about the use of a
home phone. He disputed the Court’s determination that individuals could realistically choose
between using a phone and accepting the risk of surveillance at a time when telephones are a

19

Id. at 741.
Id. at 744.
21
Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20
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necessity in modern society. Justice Marshall argued that choice requires alternatives, and to a
home phone, there are none. Additionally, Justice Marshall strongly disagreed with the majority
opinion’s assertion that phone numbers themselves do not provide enough private information to
warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy. He argues that records of dialed phone numbers can
reveal, for example, political affiliation or confidential calls made by journalists to their sources,
both of which should be protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy. 22 Allowing the
government to access these records, without a warrant, Justice Marshall argued, undermines a
tenet of our “free society.”23
Though the direct implications of Miller and Smith are largely confined to Fourth
Amendment cases that involve a third party, these decisions are significant in the landscape of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court’s adoption of the third-party doctrine greatly
undermines the Court’s prior holding in Katz, as it effectively limits privacy protections for
information that is not in any real sense voluntarily disclosed in the digital age. This Fourth
Amendment exception has become increasingly important, as individuals today disseminate
larger quantities of more sensitive information to third parties as a function of the digitalization
of our society. In my next chapter, I will discuss how the Court’s most recent digital Fourth
Amendment case narrowly limited the scope of the third-party doctrine, based in part on the
reasoning in Katz, United States v. Jones, and Riley v. California.
In 2012, the Court decided another landmark Fourth Amendment case, United States v.
Jones. In this case, the government obtained a warrant to place a global positioning system
(GPS) device on a vehicle registered to Jones’ wife. The warrant specified that the installation

22
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Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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was to occur in the District of Columbia within 10 days, but the police officers did not place the
device until the 11th day and did so in the state of Maryland. The government tracked the
movements of the car for 28 days, gathering more than 2,000 pages of location data.24 This
evidence led to an indictment of Jones on drug-trafficking-conspiracy charges.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the installation of the GPS on Jones’ vehicle,
and the subsequent location tracking for 28 days, amounted to a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, though the justices relied on significantly different rationales to reach this
conclusion. The late Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, advanced an argument that the Court
seemed to retire in Katz. He demonstrated that the Fourth Amendment’s connection to property
was the guiding principle in the majority’s opinion. Accordingly, he argued, Jones’ Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when the government affixed a GPS tracking device onto his
car without a valid warrant, because the common law trespass doctrine explicitly prohibits the
unreasonable search of a person's tangible effects. Though the majority opinion recognized the
validity of the Katz test in cases that involve modern technology, it declined to apply the Katz
analysis to the Jones facts. In response to the government’s use of the Katz test analysis to argue
that Jones did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location on public streets,
Justice Scalia asserted that the Court did not need to address the validity of Jones’s Fourth
Amendment claims through the Katz framework at all.25 Rather, Justice Scalia held that the
Court’s adoption of the Katz reasonable expectation test did not replace the common law trespass
doctrine, and, thus, a property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment could suffice to decide
this case. As such, Justice Scalia refused to engage with an analysis of the nature of the

24
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United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
Id. at 406.
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technology in question – GPS surveillance. On the other hand, Justices Alito and Sotomayor
filed concurring opinions, in which they found it imperative to discuss the type of technology in
this case, and its implications for privacy protections beyond Jones.
In his concurring opinion, with which Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined,
Justice Alito rejected the majority opinion’s application of the common law physical trespass
doctrine. In line with Fourth Amendment precedent, Justice Alito argued that Jones must be
analyzed using the Katz framework, as the trespass doctrine had been found to be insufficient in
proving a search in modern case law.26 Additionally, Justice Alito criticized the majority opinion
for employing a legal rationale certain to lead to “incongruous results.”27 He explains that the
Court’s reasoning is flawed in that it would not also apply in the analogous scenario of law
enforcement officers following a vehicle for an extended amount of time and using aerial
surveillance tools to track an individual.28 Furthermore, Justice Alito warns of the vague
implications of the majority’s opinion for the computer age. He questions how the Court’s
majority would rule on electronic invasions of personal property,29 implying that the trespass
doctrine is unacceptable for the privacy concerns of the digital age.
Following his critique of the majority opinion, Justice Alito puts forth a brief argument
for the use of the Katz reasonable expectation framework. He articulates that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test presents the Court with the challenge of deciphering what a
“hypothetical reasonable person” expects is private from the government but argues that this
analysis is critical in the digital age.30 Justice Alito suggests that the most effective way to

26

Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
28
Id. at 412 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Id. at 412 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
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address increasing demands for privacy, in the wake of new technologies, is by legislative
remedy, but recommends the Court is best suited to protect privacy by applying the Katz test to
Fourth Amendment cases. In this case, Justice Alito suggests that the extensive monitoring of
Jones’s movements “involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated,”31 and, thus, he concedes there was a Fourth Amendment search.
Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion in which she expands on the reasoning
in Justice Alito’s opinion. Justice Sotomayor agrees that the long-term surveillance of Jones’s
movements constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, but she takes this argument a step
further. Justice Sotomayor emphasizes the vast capabilities of the GPS, employed by the
government in this case, to argue that the nature of this technology could render short-term GPS
tracking in violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS
surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations. (“Disclosed in [GPS] data ... will be trips the indisputably private
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on”)32

In this passage Justice Sotomayor articulates her principal critique of the majority
opinion. She believes the majority does not adequately consider the nature of the technology in
this case, nor the implications its rationale has for future Fourth Amendment cases involving
surveillance technologies. Justice Sotomayor warns that the invasive nature of GPS surveillance
– its ability to collect intimate details of a person’s life – erodes privacy protections when

31
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Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
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utilized over, both, a long period of time and a short one. Crucially, Justice Sotomayor argues
that extensive GPS monitoring requires the Court to assess the reasonable expectation of privacy
an individual has “in the sum of one’s public movements.”33 Justice Sotomayor is concerned less
with what a reasonable person expects the police have the capacity to do, as Justice Alito
explains, and more with what a reasonable person expects the government will gather, or rather,
not gather, about their personal life.
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public
movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.34

While Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor vary slightly in their interpretations of how to
assess a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s movements, these concurring opinions reveal
a consistent legal theory of the Fourth Amendment. Both Justices adopt an approach to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence called the mosaic theory.
The mosaic theory states that a Fourth Amendment search can occur when government
activity is analyzed in “aggregate,” and found to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In
this case, the five concurring justices agreed for various reasons that the actions of the
government, over the span of 28 days, when examined collectively, constituted a Fourth
Amendment search. Leading Fourth Amendment scholar, Orin Kerr suggests this theory
demonstrates a significant departure from the traditional “sequential” approach to the Fourth
Amendment, in which police actions are examined individually and sequentially to identify

33
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when, and if, a search has occurred.35 Kerr argues that the mosaic theory effectively adds another
element to the Katz test, asking courts to assess not simply a reasonable expectation of privacy in
individual actions taken by the government, but in the sum of these actions, or according to
Justice Sotomayor, what these actions reveal of one’s private life. Conversely, in cases prior to
Jones, Kerr argues that the Court has applied the Katz reasonable expectation test in a binary
fashion, finding a search has occurred when the police surveillance violated a private space, or
not, if the police remain in public spaces.36
The mosaic theory, Kerr argues, is well-intentioned in the digital age.37 The theory
attempts to remedy the increasing privacy concerns that arise when new technology is adopted
by law enforcement and enables courts to analyze when, and if, a search has occurred when there
is no clear trespass, but Kerr suggests it is misguided.38 The mosaic theory leaves open critical
questions, such as how much aggregated data amounts to a search, and requires judges to draw
arbitrary lines regarding this question.39 Though Kerr suggests the mosaic theory is misguided,
and advocates for the continued use of a traditional application of the Katz reasonable
expectation test, this theory has become increasingly important in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Since Jones, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have used the mosaic
theory approach to analyze new Fourth Amendment cases, finding it to be particularly useful in
the digital age.

Orin S. Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,” Michigan Law Review 111, no. 3 (2012): 311–54.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol111/iss3/1/.
36
Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment.”
37
Orin S. Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” in The Digital Fourth Amendment (Oxford University Press,
Forthcoming, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3301257.
38
Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment.”
39
Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,” 314.
35
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Two years after United States v. Jones, the Court delivered a decision in Riley v.
California, presenting a legal rationale distinguished from the Fourth Amendment cases that
came before it. In Riley, the Court examined whether the search incident to arrest rule extends to
permit law enforcement officers to search an arrested person’s cell phone without a warrant. The
Court held it does not.
The petitioner in this case David Riley was initially stopped by the police for driving with
expired registration tags. The police discovered Riley’s license had been suspended, impounded
his car, and proceeded to search its contents. During this search, the police officers found two
handguns under the hood of Riley’s car and arrested him for possession of firearms.
In addition to the search and seizure of Riley's car, an officer seized Riley’s cell phone.
Both the officer and a detective searched the contents of the smartphone, finding evidence that
Riley belonged to a gang. Using evidence obtained from Riley’s phone, including photographs
that connected Riley to a previous shooting, the state charged Riley with multiple offenses
related to the prior shooting. Additionally, the evidence that Riley belonged to a gang allowed
the state to enhance Riley’s sentence. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the search of Riley’s
phone was unconstitutional. The search incident to arrest rule, which the government relied on to
search the contents of Riley’s phone, was established to protect the safety of the arresting officer
from dangerous weapons and to prevent the destruction of evidence.40 Chief Justice Roberts
argued neither criteria applies to data stored on modern day cell phones. While the opinion of the
Court recognizes an interest in searching the body of the device to ensure there is not, for
example, a razor blade between the phone and its case,41 the sensitive content of the data poses

40
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Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 383 (2014).
Id. at 387.
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no similar risk to the safety of the arresting officer. In response to the second standard for a
search incident to arrest, the prevention of the destruction of evidence, the Court held this
argument also fails when applied to cell phones. The Chief Justice notes, first, that remote
wiping is entirely anecdotal as a means by which arrested persons destroy the contents of their
cellphone to hide evidence.42 However, even if this were a prevalent concern, arresting officers
can prevent remote wiping by disconnecting a cell phone from a network. The Court held that
the data stored on modern day smartphones does not pose any risk for the arresting officer, and,
also, cannot be deemed vulnerable to destruction between an individual’s arrest and the securing
of a warrant.
The second part of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion presents a comprehensive
understanding of the implications for modern cellphones in Fourth Amendment case law, the
likes of which had not yet been recognized by a clear majority of the Supreme Court. In the
opinion, the Chief Justice argues that the quantity and quality of data that smartphones hold
distinguishes this modern technology from all analogous “effects,” such as an arrestee’s wallet or
cigarette box.43 Chief Justice Roberts notes that the modern-day cell phone “collects in one place
many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”44 In addition to the
immense quantity of revealing information that is stored on a smartphone, the opinion highlights
the complicating factor of cloud computing.45 Modern day cell phones are designed both to hold
information directly on the device and access information stored on remote servers. Thus, the
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Court argues, trying to analogize the modern-day cell phone, or the types of information on it, to
pre-digital counterparts is implausible. Chief Justice Roberts asserts: “Modern cell phones are
not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they
hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.”46
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Riley was revolutionary in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for two reasons. It symbolized a new direction for Fourth Amendment case law,
where the Court considered the privacy concerns posed by modern day smartphones and
declined to find searches of cell phones analogous to pre-digital counterparts. Additionally, this
ruling quite simply limited police power. By holding that a warrant would be required to search
the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest, the Court applied the concept Warren and Brandeis
had introduced a century earlier: new technologies necessitate new ideas of privacy and demand
enhanced protections.

A Legal Theory of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

As I have conveyed through a discussion of some of the most important Fourth
Amendment cases in the digital age, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is remarkably complex.
Over time, the Supreme Court has grappled with challenges of applying the law to new
technologies, altering the scope of the Fourth Amendment, and redefining the criteria of a Fourth
Amendment search. What has resulted is a line of case law that resolves some privacy questions
but leaves open many others. Most importantly, how will technologies unaddressed by the Court
fit into the existing legal framework, and with what rationale will the Court decide future cases?
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For decades, scholars and judges have criticized the Fourth Amendment’s messy legal
framework, arguing the law is “a mass of contradictions and obscurities.”47 While it may appear
that the Court engages in random and conflicting applications of the Fourth Amendment, subject
to change depending on the type of technology, or set of facts, there exists a compelling and
valuable defense for modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Orin Kerr suggests the explanation and justification for the Court’s perceived
inconsistencies is a theory called equilibrium adjustment.48 Kerr argues that throughout the
history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has remained consistent in one key area.
It has always decided cases with the goal of reconciling disruptions in power between the state
and individuals, as new technologies upset the prior balance.49 As Kerr describes it, “equilibrium
adjustment is a judicial response to changing technology and social practice. When new tools
and new practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant way, courts adjust
the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”50 Kerr
conceives this theory on the principle that the Fourth Amendment is unstable. The Fourth
Amendment, Kerr argues, is inherently vulnerable to the evolution of tools which expand the
police’s power to investigate and a criminal's power to commit crimes.51 When new tools and
technologies enable either the state or the citizen to upset the balance of power that existed prior
to the tool or technology’s existence, the Court must utilize equilibrium adjustment as “a
correction mechanism.”52
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Crucially, Kerr makes the argument that by and large judges engage in equilibrium
adjustment, even across the ideological spectrum. One of the key premises upon which Kerr
argues that decades of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence embody equilibrium adjustment
principles, is that judges with different constitutional approaches – pragmatists, originalists, and
living constitutionalists – all exercise this “judicial instinct” in Fourth Amendment cases.53
While some judges explicitly recognize a need for Fourth Amendment adjustment, others do so
implicitly.
Throughout this chapter, I have discussed some of the Supreme Court’s most important
Fourth Amendment decisions. These decisions demonstrate Kerr’s theory of equilibrium
adjustment at work. Kerr points to Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States, as a
salient example of this theory. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the Court erred in its
narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment when it did not find wiretapping to be a Fourth
Amendment search. He warned that developments in technology make necessary new
interpretations of the law, to ensure privacy protections remain intact. He wrote: “subtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”54
This argument, Kerr notes, is the quintessential example of the equilibrium adjustment approach.
Justice Brandeis articulated that the Court has a duty to bring Fourth Amendment protections in
line with new tools employed by the government that upset the balance of power the Framers
intended to preserve.
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In the case of United States v. Katz, the majority of the Court engaged in equilibrium
adjustment just as Justice Brandeis did in Olmstead. Justice Stewart argued that the technology
used by the police, to listen and record Katz’s phone calls, violated his right to keep private the
substance of his phone calls, and thus, under the equilibrium adjustment theory required a
strengthening of privacy protections. Additionally, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion took
Justice Stewart's equilibrium adjustment a step further by establishing a new Fourth Amendment
test that forced the Court to consider a search unconstitutional if it violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy. This test constitutes an especially clear exercise in equilibrium
adjustment, as it explicitly considers how changing technology reshapes the societal
understanding of privacy. While the reasonable expectation of privacy test does not necessarily
expand privacy protections, as seen in Miller and Smith, it does provide the Court with a more
substantial litmus test to determine when the balance of police power and individual privacy has
been compromised.
In the case of United States v. Jones, while the justices reached the same conclusion by
different means, Kerr argues that all three decisions used the mechanism of equilibrium
adjustment to formulate their rationales.55 In his article defending the theory of equilibrium
adjustment, Kerr argues that Justice Scalia engaged in equilibrium adjustment through an
originalist framework.56 Justice Scalia argued that the reasonable expectation of privacy test
could not be applied to public locations of a car, and thus employed the trespass doctrine to reach
his desired level of protection in this case. Though Justice Scalia reached a narrower decision on
privacy than Justices Alito and Sotomayor, he nevertheless attempted to restore the balance
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between government interest and individual privacy through the framework of the equilibrium
adjustment theory.
Kerr argues that Justice Alito’s concurrence reveals that he engaged in equilibrium
adjustment using the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Justice Alito suggested that the
extensive GPS monitoring used in Jones exceeded what a reasonable person expected from
police surveillance.57 Additionally, because in the pre-computer age no sort of long-term
invasive surveillance would have been reasonable to expect, Justice Alito asserted that the Court
must strengthen privacy protection to fix the balance that skewed towards too powerful police
tools.
Finally, Kerr argues that Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion also engaged in
equilibrium adjustment. In fact, Justice Sotomayor explicitly stated that the government’s use, or
rather misuse, of GPS monitoring “may alter the relationship between citizen and government in
a way that is inimical to democratic society.”58 As a result of the upset in balance between police
power and individual privacy, Justice Sotomayor contends that continued surveillance of one’s
locations, which reveals an intimate portrait of one’s life, is a Fourth Amendment search. Justice
Sotomayor, like Justice Alito tipped the scale towards greater privacy protections to restore a
limit on police power that existed before the use of GPS surveillance.59
Orin Kerr’s theory of equilibrium adjustment postulates that the Court engages in
adjusting the scope of the Fourth Amendment when faced with modern tools and technologies
that upset a balance of power between the police and citizens. While for some justices this looks
like retaining the balance that existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
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others seek to maintain the balance of power that existed before the tool or technology in
question came into use. Both methods of judicial decision making are forms of equilibrium
adjustment and both, according to Kerr, are “instinctual.”
The theory of equilibrium offers a concise explanation for the course of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence over the past century. In an effort to maintain the balance between
police power and individual privacy, the Court has consistently considered the implications of
new technologies and new tools employed by both police officers and criminals and ruled to
strengthen or weaken privacy protections to restore the prior balance. Though Kerr concedes this
theory does not provide a way to predict how the Court might respond to future technologies and
practices, it does suggest that the Court rests its Fourth Amendment decisions on the need to
preserve a constant balance between the powers of the police to investigate crimes and the power
of people to be secure in their right to privacy.
Considering the rapidly changing technology in the digital age, legal scholars and judges
alike have recognized the challenges of utilizing a traditional application of the Fourth
Amendment. The terms “houses, papers, and effects” cannot be understood as comparable to the
cellphones we carry in our pockets or the computers we keep on our desks, nor can traditional
understandings of reasonable expectations of privacy be applied to the world of modern
technology. In responding to these challenges, the Supreme Court has played a significant role in
shaping Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, engaging in continuous equilibrium adjustment to
maintain the balance between police power and individual privacy. In my next chapter, I will
discuss the Court’s most recent decision in this line of digital Fourth Amendment case law. I will
return to a discussion of the third-party doctrine and its implications for privacy in the digital
age, consider where the Court stands in terms of adopting the mosaic theory approach to the
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Fourth Amendment, and argue that the Court demonstrated another attempt at equilibrium
adjustment in the landmark case Carpenter v. United States.
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Chapter 2
The Supreme Court’s next and most recent decision concerning the Fourth Amendment
in the digital age came in 2018, when the Court handed down its decision in the landmark case
Carpenter v. United States.60 Here, for the first time, the Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of obtaining a collection of historical cell site location information without a
warrant. In a decision that would effectively reshape the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test and shrink the long-standing third-party doctrine, the Court ruled that the government’s
acquisition of an individual’s cell site location information, or CSLI, over an extended period
constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Carpenter established that a warrant is required when
the government wants to obtain a person’s historical CSLI for more than seven days.61

Carpenter v. United States

In 2011, four men were arrested on suspicion of having been involved in a string of
armed robberies in Detroit, Michigan. During the ensuing investigation, one of the suspects
cooperated with the FBI and turned over the phone numbers of 15 accomplices, each involved in
at least one of the several robberies.62 Among these individuals was Timothy Ivory Carpenter,
who at trial was identified as the leader of the operation.63 Upon receiving the names and phone
numbers of Carpenter and several other suspects, the government submitted three applications
for court orders to access the historical cell phone location records belonging to Carpenter and
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the other suspects.64 These court orders, issued under the Stored Communications Act Section
2703(d), require the government meet a lesser standard than the probable cause required for
warrant to access digitally stored electronic communications. Section 2703(d) of the SCA
provides that the government may require the disclosure of customer records information if it
“offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”65 Magistrate judges granted the
orders and the government was able to obtain 127 days – of the requested 152 days – worth of
Carpenter’s cell site location information.66
Cell site location information is produced and recorded every time a cell phone connects
to a cell tower. Cell phones connect to cell towers constantly, for example when the user makes
or receives a phone call, sends or receives a text message, and even when cell phones perform
routine data connections.67 Cell phones connect to cell sites even when the device is not in use
but is simply turned on.68 Historical CSLI refers to records of prior cell tower connections, which
reveal the past locations of cell phones, and the cell phone user. These records can be held by
service providers for various business purposes for up to five years.69
The CSLI records collected for Timothy Carpenter’s cell phone revealed 12,898 location
points spanning 127 days.70 This information allowed the government to access Carpenter’s
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location an average of 101 times per day, over the course of more than four months,71 and place
Carpenter in the general area of the robberies at around the same time as the crimes were
committed. When Carpenter moved to suppress the historical CSLI, arguing that the government
had conducted an unlawful Fourth Amendment search, the district court denied his motion. The
court denied Carpenter’s claims to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI and
found the third-party doctrine applicable to the case. More than four months’ worth of CSLI
were used against Carpenter at trial, and a jury convicted him of six robberies, with additional
counts for carrying a firearm. Carpenter was sentenced to more than 100 years in prison.72
A panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The judges
differentiated CSLI from what Carpenter argued was comparable GPS data, arguing that the
CSLI records belonged to the cellular service providers for business purposes, not the user of the
phone. Thus, the court reasoned, Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights had not been implicated
in the government’s seizure of his long term historical CSLI, and the third-party doctrine
governed this case.
In 2017, Carpenter’s case came before the Supreme Court. Carpenter first set out to
convince the Court that the CSLI records in this case were comparable to the highly sensitive and
revealing GPS location information in Jones, which five justices agreed was deserving of
constitutional protection. In Jones, five justices found that people have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the long-term GPS monitoring of their physical movements because this
information can reveal personal details about one’s private life and associations.73 Furthermore, a
majority of the justices in Jones conceded that, prior to the digital age, the data generated by a
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GPS device over an extended period of time could not have possibly been gathered by traditional
surveillance methods. Therefore, the justices argued that the government’s use of GPS
surveillance to track the whereabouts of a suspect exceeded society's expectations of what the
police can learn about an individual.74
In Carpenter, the petitioner argued that the government’s acquisition of 127 days of CSLI
violated Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and for similar reasons five justices
found GPS data violated a reasonable expectation of privacy in Jones. First and foremost, the
petitioner highlighted that the information gathered by the government in this case was generated
by a cell phone – a device which 95% of Americans use and carry constantly throughout their
everyday lives.75 Cell phone users bring their devices to work, school, on public transportation,
to appointments, and, for 12% of Americans, even in the shower.76 The location details collected
by a modern-day cell phone can reveal some of the most intimate details of a person’s life,
including when an individual is in their own home. Furthermore, in his oral argument before the
Court, Carpenter’s attorney Nathan Wessler argued that the detailed and intimate nature of cell
phone location data makes it even more deserving of Fourth Amendment protection than the
GPS data gathered in Jones. While Wessler conceded that the data generated by CSLI is less
precise than that of a GPS device, he argued that GPS tracking lacks a critical feature of CSLI.
GPS tracking devices, Wessler explained, are limited to obtaining information for the location
points of a car, but cell phones travel in most people’s pockets to every location they visit,
including doctor’s offices, shops, and inside the home.77 Thus, even though each CSLI data point
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in this case was less precise than data points of a GPS, the locations in which these data recorded
location information were far more invasive. Additionally, Wessler notes that between the time
Carpenter’s CSLI was obtained and when the case reached the Supreme Court, an increase in cell
towers, particularly in urban areas, and a significant increase in data usage resulted in the
generation of greater and more detailed CSLI.78 The petitioner highlighted for example, that
instead of simply collecting location information at the start and end of a phone call, historical
CSLI has advanced to the point where data is collected for text messages, checking email, and
many involuntary actions, including when social media apps contact a network for new
messages.79
Wessler argued that long-term tracking of CSLI triggers a reasonable expectation of
privacy that individuals have in their physical movements and in the intimate portrait this data
creates, and, crucially, that the historical nature of this information strengthens the petitioner’s
demand for constitutional protection. Prior to the development of historical CSLI records, law
enforcement was limited in the amount of information it could learn about a suspect,
retrospectively. As the petitioner notes, police officers could have only gained knowledge about
a suspect's historical location records by combining, for example, employee time cards, store
receipts, or fragments of security camera footage.80 These modes of surveillance, the petitioner
argued, “pale in comparison to the unprecedented surveillance time machine that CSLI
provides.”81 Because the wealth and intimacy of knowledge conveyed by historical CSLI could
never have been obtained using traditional tools of investigation, and goes far beyond what
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people expect law enforcement can access, Carpenter asserted that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, that society would also deem reasonable, to his historical CSLI.
The petitioner’s second main argument aimed to convince the Court that the third-party
doctrine could not govern this case. Carpenter claimed that the nature of historical CSLI is so
unlike the types of information addressed in Smith and Miller, both in sensitivity and in how the
information is generated, that the third-party doctrine could not be mechanically applied in this
case.
First, the petitioner articulated that the “sensitive and personal” nature of historical CSLI
sets it apart, significantly, from the limited records in both Smith and Miller.82 In those predigital age cases, the information obtained by the government conveyed only several days of
dialed phone numbers,83 and several months of banking records,84 respectively. The key
difference here, the petitioner argued, is that in neither of those earlier cases could the
government have used those records to generate a comprehensive, long term, and detailed
account of a person’s “locations, movements, and associations.”85 Thus, the petitioner argued,
the Court must find that the sensitivity of the information in Carpenter’s case greatly outweighs
the privacy concerns in those pre-digital cases.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that the information presented in this case is not
conveyed voluntarily “in any meaningful way.”86 In this case, the government argued that the
risk of having one’s location information disclosed to the government is assumed when a person
decides to carry a cell phone.87 The petitioner argued, however, that adopting this argument
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would be inconsistent with how the Court has previously treated modern day cell phone use. In
Riley, for example, the Court held that smartphones have become a necessary part of daily life:
“cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”88
Consistent with this understanding of the pervasiveness and necessity for cell phone use in
modern society, Carpenter reasoned that the Court must find that simply owning and carrying a
cell phone does not suffice to meet the voluntary standard for applying the third-party doctrine.
The petitioner further asserted that the production of location data also cannot be seen as
voluntary. While it may be assumed that cell phone users understand that they must be near a cell
tower to communicate over the phone, the petitioner explained, it is “outlandish to extrapolate
from that minimum knowledge the conclusion that people knowingly and voluntarily disclose
their every movement to the government.”89 Furthermore, many of the ways in which CSLI is
produced do not require action to be taken by the user. By simply having one’s cell phone turned
on, a user is subject to constant tracking by CSLI generation. “There is no way to avoid the
aggregation and retention of this location information short of turning off or disabling the
phone.”90 In fact, the petitioner points out that cellular service providers do not allow for users to
opt-out of location tracking and logging, as is the case with many cell phone apps that track
phone user’s location.91 Carpenter argued that, not only is this sharing of location information
involuntary, but it is also inescapable. Where the Court found a level of voluntariness on the part
of the individuals in Smith and Miller, and, thus, a reduced privacy interest in both types of
limited information, the Court could not determine the same here. Carpenter argued he did not, in
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any sense, voluntarily convey his sensitive and private CSLI. Therefore, he retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this information even though it was held by a third-party.
The petitioner made one final argument regarding the third-party doctrine and historical
CSLI. Carpenter claimed that, if the Court were to extend the third-party doctrine to such
sensitive and involuntarily conveyed information as historical CSLI, other forms of digital
information – including contents of communication – would be reviewed under this obsolete
doctrine.92 The petitioner highlights that the “so-called ‘internet of things’” has made it so that
even information regarding home appliances, a person’s body, nutrition, and sexual activity are
recorded and stored on third-party servers.93 The petitioner warned that if the Court were to
accept the government’s argument that the third-party doctrine governs this case, a plethora of
additional deserving information would lose Fourth Amendment protection.
Carpenter concluded that the Court must require the government to get a warrant,
supported by probable cause, to obtain long term historical CSLI. Because Carpenter was
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI, as the petitioner demonstrated, a
warrantless search of this information is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner
urged the Court to accept that any acquisition of historical CSLI must be accompanied by a
warrant.
During oral arguments, Carpenter’s lawyer argued that the Stored Communications Act,
the privacy law upon which the government acquired Carpenter's CSLI, is unsuitable to guide
law enforcement conduct as it relates to historical CSLI. Wessler explained that in 1986, when
Congress passed the Stored Communications Act, “less than one half of one percent of
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Americans had a cell phone and only 1,531 cell sites existed in the United States.94 When the
SCA was amended in relevant part in 1994, the percentage of Americans who had cell phones
only increased to about nine percent, and the number of cell sites across the country remained
under 18,000.95 In 2017, 95 percent of Americans had cell phones,96 and the number of cell sites
in the United States was around 300,000.97 Wessler argued that Congress had not anticipated
either “the contemporary ubiquity of cell phones,” or “the volume and precision of CSLI that
would be retained by service providers,” in the digital age.98 The SCA is out of touch with the
privacy interests that have emerged in recent decades. Therefore, the petitioner argued, “no
deference to this outdated legislative scheme is warranted with respect to CSLI.”99

The Court’s Ruling

In 2018, the Court delivered its ruling in Carpenter v. United States. In a 5-4 decision, a
majority of the Court held that the governments’ acquisition of long-term CSLI was a Fourth
Amendment search.100 The Court determined that people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their aggregated location data, even when that information is collected and held by a
third-party. Thus, the Court established that, at least in some sensitive cases, the third-party
doctrine does not automatically override privacy interests.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. The Chief Justice begins the opinion with an overview of the type of
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information at issue in the case, CSLI. Reminiscent of the petitioner’s argument, he highlights
the pervasiveness of cell phone use in modern day, as well as the constant, automatic, and
involuntary nature by which CSLI is recorded and retained by cell service providers.101 The
Chief Justice then explains that the Court’s approach to Fourth Amendment cases involving
innovative surveillance tools has historically recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
“certain expectations of privacy.”102 Thus, the goal of the Court is – and has been – to ensure
that, as modern technology advances and redefines police powers, the Fourth Amendment
continues to adequately protect ‘“the privacies of life” against ‘arbitrary power.’”103
As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally
guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to “assure preservation of that
degree of privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”104
Following the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the Court’s responsibility to protect privacy
interests against unreasonable police powers, he asserts that this case does not “fit neatly under
existing precedents.”105 Rather, this case implicated a set of decisions involving a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements and locations, and cases involving
information voluntarily disclosed to a third-party entity. In Jones, the Court held that the
government’s installation of a GPS device on the petitioner’s car, and the subsequent tracking of
his movements and locations, amounted to a Fourth Amendment search – with five justices
accepting that a search occurred because of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, the CSLI
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was distinct in that it involved information held by a third party. Ultimately, however, the Chief
Justice argued that the third-party doctrine could not be applied to the facts in Carpenter.106
Accepting several of the key arguments made by the petitioner, Chief Justice Roberts
asserted that the unique nature of the CSLI in this case challenged a traditional application of the
third-party doctrine. In holding that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI,” the Court concluded a
Fourth Amendment search had occurred.107
In his reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts articulates several key factors which led the
majority to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s CSLI records. First, the Chief
Justice highlights the detailed, revealing, and intimate nature of location information.
As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a
person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”108
The Court, Chief Justice Roberts argued, has already recognized that the long-term monitoring of
a person’s every move exceeds what society expects the police have the capacity to learn. This
same expectation exists here. Furthermore, the Chief Justice accepted the petitioner’s argument
that historical CSLI raises heightened privacy concerns compared to GPS information. Cell
phones, unlike cars, he argued, follow the user into nearly every place they go.109 Collecting a
person’s CSLI, it follows, can equate to “near perfect surveillance, as if [the government] had
attached an ankle monitor to the phone user.”110
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The opinion also highlights a significant privacy interest in historical CSLI because of its
retrospective quality. The Chief Justice again references the idea that society expects practical
limitations to stand in the way of police surveillance, but that these practical limitations have
diminished in the face of modern technologies. Prior to the digital age, the government was
constrained by “a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection,” the Chief Justice argued. 111
Today, on the other hand, CSLI allows the government to trace the past locations of all cell
phone users going back years, merely depending on the policies of service providers.112
Crucially, this retrospectivity, unique to historical CSLI, enables the information to implicate all
phone users, not just criminal suspects. The Chief Justice asserts that “only the few without cell
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”113
Additionally, despite the government’s argument that the CSLI presented in this case is
less precise than the GPS data in Jones, Chief Justice Roberts asserts that the Court must
consider where the technology is headed. He writes, “the rule the Court adopts ‘must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or development.’”114 Furthermore,
the Chief Justice recognized, as the petitioner pointed out, that the records gathered here were a
product of the technology at the beginning of the decade. Not only has CSLI become more
accurate, but the majority asserted it is quickly approaching the precision of GPS data.115 Here,
the Chief Justice explicitly accounts for the continuous development of CSLI that is likely to
come and pose even greater privacy concerns than the records present in the case.
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Chief Justice Roberts then explains why the third-party doctrine cannot apply in this case.
He contends with the petitioner that the government fails to appreciate the evolution of tracking
in the digital age. The Chief Justice argues not only has modern CSLI made every cell phone
user susceptible to constant tracking, but the nature of the tracking has also changed: “Sprint
Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who
keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly
infallible.”116 The majority of the Court found that the “exhaustive chronicle of location
information”117 that long-term CSLI produces could not be compared to the limited personal
information in Smith and Miller. Thus, the Chief Justice asserts, “the Government…is not asking
for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of
it to a distinct category of information.”118
The Court also asserted, as the petitioner argued, that CSLI was distinct from the types of
information in Smith and Miller in voluntariness – defeating the second rationale of the thirdparty doctrine. Given that the Court asserted both that having a cell phone is “indispensable to
participation in modern society,”119 and that “a cell phone logs a cell-site records by dint of its
operation, without any affirmative action on the part of the user,” the majority held that CSLI in
“no meaningful sense” requires the user to assume the risk of the whole of their movements
being exposed.120
Though the Court held that the third-party doctrine did not apply to Carpenter’s longterm historical CSLI in this case, the majority opinion claimed the decision was “a narrow
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one.”121 Chief Justice Roberts explained that this decision did not disturb Smith and Miller, nor
answer questions about real-time CSLI or “call into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools.”122 In my next chapter I will illuminate the merits of the majority’s claim
that Smith and Miller remain intact post-Carpenter.
The Chief Justice concluded that the Court’s finding of a Fourth Amendment search in
this case necessitates a warrant for future government acquisition of historical CSLI.123 The
majority argued that the criteria for obtaining CSLI under a SCA court order is out of line with
the privacy interest in this type of record. Therefore, if the government wants to gain access to
CSLI, it must first obtain a warrant issued on probable cause.
The Chief Justice finishes the majority opinion by reiterating the Court’s reasoning for
limiting the scope of the third-party doctrine in this case and extending Fourth Amendment
protection to historical CSLI:
In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such
information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection.124

Kerr & Ohm on Carpenter

Since the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Carpenter v. United States, Fourth
Amendment scholars have devoted significant attention to interpreting the Court’s opinion,
attempting to understand the new Fourth Amendment test and the Court’s legal reasoning. In this
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section, I will explore some of the key takeaways that scholars in the field have highlighted as
they have examined the Court’s landmark decision.
Leading Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr has dedicated two chapters of his
forthcoming book, titled The Digital Fourth Amendment, to dissecting the Carpenter opinion. In
them, he explains how the decision changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and provides a
guide for how lower courts can apply the new Carpenter legal framework.125 Kerr first argues
that Carpenter reshaped the Katz reasonable expectation test from an analysis of privacy
interests in places and things to an analysis of what certain information has the capacity to
reveal.126 Kerr explains that a close analysis of Fourth Amendment case law reveals the Court
has, until Carpenter, focused its decisions on a reasonable expectation of privacy in places and
things.127 He asserts Katz did not end the place-based doctrine.128 Rather, Kerr argues that the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test historically asked whether a person had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a place or thing because it was “sufficiently home-like to merit Fourth
Amendment rights.”129 Kerr asserts that Carpenter represents the first major break from this
precedent, ushering in a new privacy test that “focuses on how much the government can learn
about a person regardless of the place or things from which the information came.”130 The post–
Carpenter test asks whether technology has lifted a prior limit on government power that society
has recognized as reasonable.
Kerr suggests that the Court’s reformulation of the Katz test was a product of equilibrium
adjustment. Kerr’s theory of equilibrium adjustment states that when new technologies transform
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government power, and, in turn threaten citizens’ privacy, the Court adjusts Fourth Amendment
rules “to restore preexisting limits on that power.”131 In Carpenter, Kerr argues, a majority of the
Court demonstrated concerns that people can no longer protect their private information in the
digital age. “The sensitive records have moved,” Kerr writes.132 “A majority of the Justices felt
they needed a new way for the Fourth Amendment to protect private information wherever it
went.”133 So, Kerr argues, equilibrium adjustment led the Court to adopt a new Fourth
Amendment approach in response to privacy concerns in the digital age. This approach focuses
on how technologies have enabled the police to use surveillance tools which were previously
nonexistent rather than on our reasonable expectation so privacy with regard to particular items
or places.
Interestingly, Kerr argues that the Court’s case for equilibrium adjustment here was
premature. The state of CSLI, he asserted, was not quite as invasive and revealing as the Court
claimed.134 Kerr explains that the evidence in the case only placed Carpenter within the span of a
half-mile to two miles from a cell tower when a call was made or ended.135 This range indicated
only the general neighborhood in which Carpenter’s phone was located.136 Though Kerr
concedes the amount of information the government obtained was extensive, he emphasizes that
the reality of CSLI’s precision and invasiveness does not quite live up to the Court’s description
of it as “deeply revealing,” an “exhaustive chronicle” of one’s movements, or “absolute
surveillance.”137 In his opinion, the Chief Justice explains that the Court must respond to the
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direction in which CSLI is headed – one of “GPS-level precision,”138 but Kerr finds this
argument unconvincing. Kerr recommends the Court engage in equilibrium adjustment once a
new technology has stabilized, and not in an effort to predict what protections may be necessary
in the future.139 Nevertheless, Kerr argues that the Court did create a framework that can apply to
other digital technologies that do raise the kinds of privacy concerns expressed in Carpenter.140
Kerr provides a three-requirement test, consistent with the Court’s opinion in Carpenter, for
applying these new Fourth Amendment rules to various other categories of records.
First, Kerr identifies that the records collected must be “available because of digital
technology.”141 Kerr argues that a Carpenter search should only be triggered when the
information “could not be collected in a pre-digital age.”142 This requirement, Kerr explains,
comes directly out of the language in the majority opinion of Carpenter. The Chief Justice
distinguished the CSLI in this case because, as a result of “seismic shifts in digital
technology,”143 CSLI is “an entirely different species”144 of record, that did not “fit neatly under
existing precedents.”145 As the majority opinion articulated, long-term CSLI generation has
changed expectations about what law enforcement can do and ultimately earned Fourth
Amendment protection because it was incomparable to any record that came before it. Thus,
Kerr argues, Carpenter does not implicate traditional surveillance tools that existed prior to the
digital age.146 Again, Kerr argues that this feature of a Carpenter search is premised on
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equilibrium adjustment.147 In prior Fourth Amendment cases, the Court found searches occurred
when a modern technology implicated privacy concerns akin to those in a protected place, like
the home. For example, in Katz, the Court held that a person is entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection in a phone booth, as it raised similar privacy concerns to those of a home. Kerr
explains that, unlike this traditional framework, the Court now understands that new technologies
and the internet are entirely different and new Fourth Amendment rules for these digital age
technologies are necessary.
Kerr also maintains that a record must be created “without…meaningful voluntary
choice” to meet the requirements of a Carpenter search.148 In Carpenter, the Court held that the
third-party doctrine could not apply to CSLI because the tracking was inescapable – the Court
found it implausible that having a cell phone is a voluntary choice in modern society given its
pervasiveness in all aspects of daily life. Thus, Kerr concludes that the Court in Carpenter
recognized there are some types of information that we are essentially required to reveal by
virtue of participating in modern life.149 The Fourth Amendment covers this type. Understood as
yet another form of equilibrium adjustment, Kerr asserts that the Court reimagined what
voluntariness means in the digital age. Crucially, though, Kerr emphasizes the majority opinion’s
assertion that Carpenter does not upset the precedent of Smith and Miller. Rather, Kerr argues
Carpenter narrowly tailored the third-party doctrine, or placed an “equilibrium-adjustment cap”
on it.150 While information that is inevitably shared for participation in modern society post-
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Carpenter will receive protection, Kerr argues that information which is not conveyed for
necessary participation in modern life is likely left unprotected.151
Kerr argues that the final Carpenter requirement is that the record in question “be of a
kind that tends to reveal an intimate portrait of a person’s life typically beyond legitimate state
interest.”152 Kerr highlights that Carpenter prevents the government from being able to access a
great deal of private and personal information about individuals, especially information
irrelevant to criminal investigations, by limiting its access to records which have the tendency to
reveal such intimacies.153 This decision relied on the Court’s long-standing commitment to
protecting information that reveals “the privacies of life,” with a high level of scrutiny. In Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, she emphasizes that extensive location tracking has the
potential to reveal intimate details of one’s life including their “familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.”154 As many judges have agreed, these personal facts are of no
legitimate interest to the government, and in fact, consist of some of the most intimate facts that
people generally avoid sharing with the government.155 Thus, the Court also established that
when a new technology reveals intimate and personal details of a person’s life it is likely to
receive Carpenter protection.
In his interpretation, Kerr argues that while Carpenter constitutes a premature effort of
equilibrium adjustment, it is a “resounding win” for the theory which aims to retain the proper
balance of police powers and privacy protections.156 Kerr explains that the Carpenter Court
broke away from a traditional understanding of the Katz privacy test, to one that examines

Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 22.
Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 22.
153
Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 22.
154
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
155
Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 24-6.
156
Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 1.
151
152

46

whether technology enables police conduct to violate our expectations, rather than whether the
source of the information is deserving of a privacy claim. Kerr also understands that Carpenter
established a new test, likely to apply to digital technologies novel in the digital age that gather
information about individuals without their voluntary choice and tend to reveal the intimate
details of people’s lives. Ultimately, Kerr demonstrates that the Court was able to, once again,
bring Fourth Amendment doctrine in line with the privacy concerns of the digital age in
Carpenter, and rebalance the scale to ensure modern day technologies do not enable the
government to encroach on personal privacy in ways previously unimaginable.
Paul Ohm, another prominent scholar of information privacy and the law, has also written
about the Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States. In his article for the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology, Ohm argues that Carpenter brought a “series of revolutions” to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.157 Ohm begins by defending the multi-factor test that came out of
Carpenter but suggests that a rule which he calls technological equivalence may end up
becoming the most influential Carpenter rule in the future.158 Ohm also asserts that the Court’s
recognition of a “tech exceptionalism” had led to a revolution in Fourth Amendment reasoning
by redefining the Katz reasonable expectation test. Ohm’s interpretation reflects similarities to
Kerr’s ideas of equilibrium adjustment and the changes the Carpenter Court made to legal
reasoning in the face of modern technology. However, Ohm celebrates the Court’s eagerness to
extend Fourth Amendment protections to evolving technologies in a way that Kerr critiques.
Ohm interprets the Carpenter multi-factor test as arising from the concluding statements
of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. “When the police seek to obtain information about individual
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behavior contained in a private party’s database,” Ohm writes, “the court examines (1) “the
deeply revealing nature” of the information; (2) “its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”;
and (3) “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”’159 In his analysis of these three
factors, Ohm largely reiterates the defense for this test that the Chief Justice provides in his
opinion. The Court ruled the acquisition of long term CSLI was a search because location
information in aggregate can reveal deeply personal facts about one’s life – triggering the first
factor; the technology runs against everyone and is retrospective in nature – triggering the second
factor; and CSLI is largely inescapable in the modern day and automatically generated –
fulfilling the third factor of the test. Ohm argues these factors provide guidance for determining
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular database, and then if
third-party doctrine applies.160 However, Ohm suggests that a rule which has been implicitly
endorsed by seven justices on the Court – the rule of technological equivalence – may end up
becoming the most frequently cited Carpenter rule.161
Ohm argues that this rule of tech equivalence stems from the Court’s opinion in Kyllo v.
United States,162 a case where the Court held the police needed to obtain a warrant to use a
thermal imaging device on the outside of a person’s home. In that case, the majority’s key
argument was that the thermal imaging device enabled the government to explore features of the
interior of a home that it could have only otherwise known by physically entering the home. In
Kyllo, the Court established a principle which Ohm argues Carpenter expanded upon. Ohm
writes that the rule of technological equivalence states that “if a technology, or a near-future
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improvement, gives police the power to gather information that is the ‘modern-day equivalent’ of
activity that has been held to be a Fourth Amendment search, the use of that technology is also a
search.”163
Ohm articulates three specific rules of technological equivalence which can help guide
future Fourth Amendment cases more easily than the Carpenter multi-factor test. The first of
these three rules stipulates that the Fourth Amendment protects information from new
technologies that reveal “details from inside the home.”164 Ohm explains that this line of
reasoning likely extends Fourth Amendment protections to “devices that comprise the Internet of
Things,” like Amazon and Google smart homes and advanced thermostats.165 Here, the rule of
technological equivalence need not require that courts assess the sensitivity of the information.
As the Court found in Kyllo, “all details [of the home] are intimate details.”166 Ohm argues that
the simplicity of this framework, compared to the multi-factor test, is compelling and might
result in this becoming a key factor in future decisions.167
The second conceptualization of the rule of technological equivalence references the law
of bailment. The law of bailment, most fundamentally, states that when an individual entrusts
another with their property, the bailee has a legal duty to protect the items they are holding.168
Ohm points out that Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch, two dissenting justices in Carpenter, have
expressed support for the law of bailment as a legal rationale for limiting the third-party
doctrine.169 In his Carpenter dissent, Justice Gorsuch writes: “Just because you entrust your
data–in some case, your modern-day papers and effects–to a third party may not mean you lose
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any Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.”170 Ohm argues that because a larger majority of
the Court supports the tech equivalence rule of bailment, rather than the complex three-factor test
the majority put forth, this could guide future third-party Fourth Amendment cases.
The third application of the rule of technological equivalence applies to private
communications. Ohm notes that all nine justices on the Carpenter Court conceded that the
content of email messages must be protected by the Fourth Amendment.171 Since the 1878 case
of Ex Parte Jackson, which held a warrant was required to open sealed letters from the United
States postal service,172 one appellate court has extended this protection of physical mail to email
messages.173 Relying on this tech equivalence argument, Ohm suggests this Court’s recognition
of Fourth Amendment rights in email messages, or modern day letters, might lead courts to
protect other forms of electronic communications.174 The rule of technological equivalence to
private communication could become the test in future content-related Fourth Amendment cases.
Ohm argues that this broad rule of technological equivalence has revolutionized Fourth
Amendment reasoning. Beginning with the majority opinion in Kyllo, the Court has been
developing this Fourth Amendment standard which grants Fourth Amendment protection to
digital information that traditionally could have only been discovered through a Fourth
Amendment search. Carpenter, Ohm asserts, solidified this rule.
Finally, Ohm argues that throughout the opinion in Carpenter, and beginning with Riley,
the Court, and specifically the Chief Justice, has demonstrated “a belief in the exceptional nature
of the modern technological era.”175 The Court’s tech exceptionalism, Ohm argues, has led to
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several revolutions in legal reasoning. The revolution I will focus on here explains that tech
exceptionalism led the Carpenter Court reinvent the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test.176
Ohm highlights that Katz test has long been understood as consisting of two parts: First, it
asks whether a person exhibited a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy, and second,
whether society is ready to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Overtime scholars have
debated whether the Court actually considers subjective expectations of privacy, or, instead, if it
decides for the American people “the kind of society the Constitution seeks to protect.”177 Ohm
argues that Carpenter settles confusion over this test.
Carpenter selects the normative over the descriptive: the role of the courts is to protect
the balance of power between the state (in the form of the police) and the people, refusing
to let technological change eviscerate individual privacy and security from the state.”178
In this passage, it is clear Ohm recognizes the Court’s equilibrium adjustment in
Carpenter. He explains that the Court’s tech exceptionalism empowered it to take a proactive
role uniquely necessary for the privacy concerns of the digital age. Ohm interprets Carpenter as
the Court placing barriers in the way of invasive policing techniques as it saw the CSLI
becoming more precise and invasive in the future. Kerr argues the same about equilibrium
adjustment. While Kerr argues this equilibrium adjustment was premature because the Court
reacted to the direction the technology was heading, not its state at the time of the decision, Ohm
celebrates this forward-thinking approach.
The unprecedented, rapidly changing nature of technology also causes the Court to relax
its rules about restricting its attention to the record evidence before it…In Carpenter and
Riley, the Court refused to resign itself to this fate. Instead, it relaxed, just slightly, its
practices by peeking a little at the present and the future.”179
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The tech exceptionalism which Ohm identifies as driving much of the majority opinion in
Carpenter has led the Court to treat technologies of the digital age differently than the
technologies that came before them. The Chief Justice reasoned in Carpenter that the Court must
take account of where the cell site location technology is heading and protect against the privacy
harms to be caused in the future. Ohm praises Chief Justice Roberts for his reasoning and his
recognition of the rapid-changing nature of technologies in the digital age.180
Both Kerr and Ohm argue that Carpenter infused several changes into Fourth
Amendment law. These scholars concede that the majority opinion reshapes the Katz reasonable
expectation test, though they argue it did so in distinct ways. Kerr argues Carpenter shifted the
test to address how our expectations of police powers have changed in the digital age, while
Ohm claims Carpenter replaced the traditional test altogether, ushering in a new proactive role
for the judiciary to play in safeguarding privacy interests from future harms. Kerr suggests the
Court’s decision rests on a wrongfully portrayed set of facts, constituting a premature act of
equilibrium adjustment, while Ohm celebrates the Carpenter Court’s willingness to adjust the
Fourth Amendment to account for developing technologies. Though these scholars provide
nuanced understandings of the Court’s motivation to extend Fourth Amendment protection to
historical CSLI, and interpret the Court’s opinion in different ways, both scholars contend that
Carpenter constitutes a large shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that rests on the
principles of equilibrium adjustment and the Court’s commitment to revisiting Fourth
Amendment doctrines as new technologies render old laws ineffective. In my next chapter, I will
examine the merits of these scholar’s interpretation of the Carpenter test and its doctrinal shifts,
as the post-Carpenter legal landscape has developed over the past several years. This chapter
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will closely examine Fourth Amendment scholar Matthew Tokson’s empirical analysis of
Carpenter’s effect on Fourth Amendment law in lower courts, as well as address his predictions
after Carpenter.
One final consideration of the Carpenter decision is the Court’s possible endorsement of
the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment, which asserts that some data in aggregate
poses greater privacy harms than individual pieces of information, justifying a reasonable
expectation of privacy to a certain amount of data. Throughout the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts emphasizes the “long-term” nature of the CSLI collected in Carpenter. The
justices who joined the majority demonstrate great concern for the extensive collection of
location information, and, consequently, what this data in aggregate has the potential to reveal
about a person. But, as scholars point out, one of the most confusing aspects of the Carpenter
decision was the Court’s decision to hold seven days of CSLI a search, but potentially not less
than this amount.181 Though not defended explicitly in the opinion, the third footnote of the
Carpenter opinion specifies that a search of CSLI data occurs when more than seven days of the
information is obtained by the government without a warrant.182 The Chief Justice writes: “it is
sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.”183 As Kerr notes, “Carpenter thus leaves a big question unanswered: If the
massive scale of digital surveillance justifies new Fourth Amendment regulation, is it only digital
surveillance on a massive scale that counts?”184 In their interpretations of the opinion, Kerr and
Ohm explore this consequential legal issue, conceding that the Court might have adopted the
mosaic theory approach in Carpenter.
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Both Kerr and Ohm suggest that the opinion in Carpenter leaves open the possibility that
the Court applied the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment, as the Court held the
long-term collection of CSLI was a search. As Kerr argues, the mosaic theory is rooted in
equilibrium adjustment.185 This theory attempts to remedy the reality that short-term and longterm surveillance pose different privacy risks. But, while Kerr argues the theory is “wellmeaning,”186 he asserts it must be rejected as a Fourth Amendment approach.
The largest problem for the mosaic theory, Kerr asserts, is that it requires incredibly
arbitrary line drawing.187 Not only will courts have to grapple with “how long is long enough,”
or how much information is required to constitute a search, but Kerr also notes that by the time
specific rules are set for different forms of technology, it is likely that “technological change
would have made the rules obsolete.”188 Given the sheer number of questions that the mosaic
theory raises, in trying to distinguish how much surveillance, or data, amounts to a Fourth
Amendment search, Kerr argues this theory should be rejected. Additionally, Kerr suggests that
the mosaic theory approach forces the courts into a tedious case-by-case analysis, wherein judges
“act more like legislators and number-crunchers than judges.”189
Ohm argues, more decisively than Kerr, that the language in the Carpenter opinion
actually “in effect endorses the mosaic theory of privacy.”190 In his discussion of the Court’s
second Carpenter test factor – “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach,”191 Ohm suggests that
the Court indicated the quantity of CSLI was one of the most important factors that led the Court
to conclude a search took place in Carpenter. Ohm further argues that based on the Court’s
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emphasis of these factors, it implies that a single datum of CSLI would not trigger a search, and
only a collection of CSLI does.192 Hence, an application of the mosaic theory.
Still, like Kerr, Ohm argues that the mosaic theory is itself problematic. He notes that the
Court declined to root its seven-day distinction in Carpenter in any real reasoning,193 revealing
the imprecision of mosaic theory line drawing. Looking forward, Ohm asserts that weighing the
quantitative facts of different types of data to distinguish when a search has occurred is “sure to
be the source of confusion in the lower court – and inside police stations.”194
Kerr and Ohm agree that the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment may have
been employed by the Court in Carpenter, but suggest this approach is ill equipped to answer the
many questions that arise when courts weigh the privacy interests against police surveillance. In
my next chapter, I will address how the mosaic theory has fared in lower courts post-Carpenter.
In this chapter I have discussed the most important arguments leading up to and coming
out of the Supreme Court’s most recent digital Fourth Amendment case, Carpenter v. United
States. I have examined how the Court’s understanding of a reasonable expectation of privacy
has evolved in the face of more pervasive and invasive technology and how the long-standing
third-party doctrine has diminished in the digital age. Additionally, I explored the work of Fourth
Amendment scholars Kerr and Ohm in order to understand the Carpenter test that emerged and
the legal arguments upon which the majority decided the case. Crucially, I highlight Orin Kerr’s
assertion that Carpenter is yet another example of equilibrium adjustment, and that in doing so
the Court carved out new Fourth Amendment rules for the technologies of the digital age. I have
also discussed Ohm’s analysis of the Court’s tech exceptionalism, which has enabled the Court
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to take a more active role in safeguarding privacy interests in the face of rapidly developing
technologies. Finally, I illuminate one of the key legal issues that remained unclear after
Carpenter – the mosaic theory – and discuss how scholars respond to this lingering legal
question. In my next chapter, I will examine the patterns of post-Carpenter lower court decisions
and analyze specific opinions. Doing so will allow me to assess how the Supreme Court’s
guidance, as well as the predictions of Fourth Amendment scholars, have fared in the several
years since the Court’s decision.
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Chapter 3
Carpenter in the Lower Courts
The two previous chapters of this thesis have explored how, over the course of nearly a
century, the Supreme Court has developed and reshaped Fourth Amendment doctrine as rigid
rules fail to cover new privacy threats in the digital age. I have also discussed several prominent
Fourth Amendment scholars’ interpretations of the Supreme Court’s most recent digital privacy
case, Carpenter v. United States, highlighting areas of consensus and contention. Ultimately,
scholars agree that the Court demonstrated an appreciation for the unique privacy harms posed
by modern technologies and surveillance methods, whether the Court's legal reasoning signaled a
break from precedent or not. Here, I will explore Carpenter’s legacy in the lower courts,
highlighting how these courts have clarified the Carpenter doctrinal shift and how they have
grappled with the ambiguity of the mosaic theory in the post-Carpenter landscape.
As I discussed in my previous chapter, Fourth Amendment scholars debate both the legal
rationale of the Carpenter decision and the test established by the majority opinion. Kerr
suggests that the Carpenter rationale signals a shift away from the traditional Fourth Amendment
Katz test, but that this test only extends to types of surveillance techniques and tools which are
unique to the digital age.195 Additionally, Kerr suggests Carpenter only covers information from
digital-age technologies that is particularly revealing and involuntarily disclosed.196 Ohm argues
that the Katz test was replaced by the Court’s new Carpenter test, which can be derived from the
factors described in Chief Justice Roberts’ concluding remarks in the majority opinion.197 Ohm
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also suggests that several rules of technological equivalence may see more support than the Chief
Justice’s multiple-factor test in the future.198 Matthew Tokson’s interpretation diverges from
those of Kerr and Ohm, as he argues Carpenter was consistent with a line of Fourth Amendment
cases. He suggests that the Court has consistently placed greater weight on protecting against
privacy harms than adhering to other doctrinal demands.199 Additionally, Tokson suggests
Carpenter did not set out a clear test, but instead vaguely discussed several factors which led the
Court to find that the long-term collection of CSLI was a search.200
Now, scholars no longer need to speculate about how Carpenter has affected Fourth
Amendment law. In the past four years, lower courts have begun to answer the open-ended
questions of Carpenter, thereby developing and solidifying the doctrinal shifts of the Court’s
most recent digital privacy case. Some scholars have noted that the phenomenon exhibited here
is common following transformative decisions in the Supreme Court.201 For example, Evan
Caminker and Richard Re both emphasize that Supreme Court precedents often require lower
courts to further interpret and shape the law.202 Furthermore, when the Court’s decision is
ambiguous, lower court development of the law becomes even more crucial, as it can foster a
“precedential dialogue” between the Supreme Court and lower courts.203 Tokson explains that
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the Court may look to lower court interpretations and extensions of new precedent to better
inform its rulings in the future and make clear the legal change that results from its decisions.204
Tokson refers to Carpenter as the “quintessential” landmark Supreme Court case that has
required further interpretation in the lower courts.205 Through lower courts’ interpretations of
Carpenter, Tokson suggests we can gauge how Carpenter will be understood and applied in
future cases.206 Furthermore, Tokson highlights that the workability of Carpenter in the lower
courts legitimizes the decision and “may also bolster arguments for preserving and extending
it.”207 While the Supreme Court has stated that it may be appropriate to revisit prior decisions if
they become unworkable in the lower courts, the widespread adoption of Carpenter suggests
lower courts have handled the ambiguity of the decision coherently.208 Additionally, Tokson
notes that the number of cases interpreting Carpenter narrowly has decreased over time, as
familiarity with the decision has increased,209 substantiating further the claim that Carpenter’s
ambiguity has allowed for productive lower court development of this legal shift. In my next
section, I will illuminate some of Tokson’s key findings from his analysis of the direct impact of
Carpenter in lower court Fourth Amendment cases. In the ensuing analysis, I will specifically
discuss Tokson’s research regarding the role of the Carpenter factors in determining lower court
case outcomes and highlight Tokson’s conclusions about the Carpenter test that have emerged
during the past few years.
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Tokson: An Empirical Study of Fourth Amendment Law

Tokson has conducted the most comprehensive study of the impact of Carpenter v.
United States to date, analyzing the 857 federal and state court rulings to cite Carpenter from its
publication in June of 2018 through March of 2021.210 Tokson finds that lower courts have
largely complied with Carpenter, and argues that the large number of decisions that cite
Carpenter reflects the “enormous impact” of the case in Fourth Amendment law.211 In his
research, Tokson determined that of the 857 cases to cite Carpenter in his data set, 399 of those
cases applied Carpenter substantively to assess whether a search had taken place.212 The
remainder of these cases only cited the decision in more general discussions of Fourth
Amendment law.213 Still, Tokson suggests the impact of the decision is significant and growing.
For example, across the data set of determinative yes-or-no rulings, Tokson finds that the
proportion of cases which applied a strong pre-Carpenter third-party doctrine decreased by five
percentage points between 2018 and the end of 2020.214 This indicates that, as lower courts have
grown more familiar with Carpenter’s “reformation of the third-party doctrine,” they are
increasingly complying with its guidance.215
Tokson also demonstrates, persuasively, that the impact of Carpenter can be examined
through lower court’s applications of Carpenter factors in determining case outcomes. There are
several influential Carpenter factors which Tokson, and other scholars glean from the language
of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. The first is the revealing nature of the data or information,
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which can be gauged by the information’s “tendency to disclose sensitive or intimate details.”
Through this factor, courts examine whether the government was able to learn private
information that is deeply revealing about the subject of a search, including their habits, social
practices, and associations.216 The second factor is the amount of information gathered, which
indicates that extensive collection of personal data is significant and can give rise to a Fourth
Amendment violation.217 Tokson identifies a third possible Carpenter factor, which Ohm finds
critical to the Court’s rationale in Carpenter, the factor of the number of people affected by a
surveillance tool or technology.218 Because the Court referenced “the comprehensive reach” of a
type of surveillance, scholars have concluded that the number of people affected by a
surveillance practice may be influential in future Fourth Amendment decisions.219 Tokson
highlights the fourth and fifth potential Carpenter factors, inescapability and automatic
disclosure of information.220 He argues that these concepts are related,221 and concedes that the
Court indicated inescapability of the technology and automatic, involuntary disclosure of
information might be requirements for protection under Carpenter.222 Lastly, Tokson mentions a
sixth factor, the cost of a surveillance tool or technique.223 Tokson notes that the Carpenter Court
recognized the cheap and efficient nature of gathering CSLI, and thus lower courts may
differentiate Fourth Amendment searches from non-searches based on the cost of the
surveillance technique or technology.224 While Tokson argues that Carpenter “gave no concrete
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test to guide future decisions,”225 he does note that these factors clearly shaped the Carpenter
decision and have influenced lower court decisions in the post-Carpenter era.
Tokson devotes a significant amount of attention to analyzing the impact of each
Carpenter factor in lower court rulings. According to his analysis, of the 399 cases that
substantively applied Carpenter, 217 resolved a Fourth Amendment issue in a determinative yesor-no ruling.226 Among these cases, 129 decisions mentioned at least one of the Carpenter
factors in assessing a Fourth Amendment claim, and 112 of those cases stated at least one of the
Carpenter factors clearly favored a certain party.227 Based on his evaluation of the prevalence
and influence of each Carpenter factor, Tokson concludes that the most frequently discussed
factors are the revealing nature of the information in question, the amount of data collected, and
the automatic nature of the disclosure of the particular data.228
Tokson determined that lower courts cited the Carpenter factor of the revealing nature of
the information, or its ability to reveal intimate and private details of an individual, in a total of
93 decisions.229 In 69 of the 70 lower court rulings that discussed the revealing nature of the
information, and came to a determinative ruling, the court’s analysis of the information’s
capacity to reveal intimate information was dispositive in the case.230 In other words, the court’s
analysis of this factor was influential in the court’s determination at a rate of 98.6%.231 Tokson
highlights that lower courts “almost never failed to find a search after determining that surveilled
data was revealing, and never found a search after determining that surveilled data was
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unrevealing.”232 Tokson’s analysis of the cases demonstrates that, when the revealing nature of
the data at issue is discussed, it is the most influential Carpenter factor in resolving a Fourth
Amendment claim.
The prevalence and influence of this factor aligns with the predictions of Kerr, Ohm, and
Tokson. Across each of their differing interpretations, these scholars highlight that the revealing
nature of the information was significant in Carpenter, and, thus, that it would prevail as a highly
significant consideration in future decisions.233 Furthermore, Tokson argues that the intimacy of
the information sought in Fourth Amendment cases has been a crucial concern since Katz v.
United States.234 So, Carpenter’s emphasis of this factor, and its subsequent influence in lower
courts, demonstrates consistency with prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Carpenter factor related to the amount of data collected was also both prevalent and
influential when applied to lower court cases.235 This factor was mentioned in 116 cases, and 71
of the 77 cases to reach a determinative decision did so because of the amount factor, whether it
ruled in favor of a search or not.236 Tokson also notes the significant influence of this factor, as it
indicated the decision at a rate of 92.2%.237 The prevalence and influence of this factor in lower
court cases is likely unsurprising to Kerr, Ohm, and Tokson, who all note the significance of the
Court’s discussion of the amount of CSLI gathered in Carpenter. Lower courts’ adoption of this
Carpenter factor does, however, go against the advice of Kerr and Ohm who are particularly
wary of an adoption of the mosaic theory.238 In fact, Kerr suggests that the Carpenter framework
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should not include an evaluation of the amount of information collected, as it leads to arbitrary
line drawing and inconsistent results.239 I will discuss the relationship between lower courts’
consideration of the amount of information in a case and the mosaic theory later in this chapter.
According to Tokson, the automatic nature of the data disclosure was mentioned less
frequently than the revealing nature or amount of data collected, but was similarly influential
when discussed.240 This Carpenter factor was mentioned in 61 cases, 46 of which delivered a
determinative ruling.241 Of the 46 cases, 44 of them indicated that the automatic factor
determined the decision.242 This factor indicated the decision at a significantly high rate of
95.7%.243 This finding favors each of the scholars’ interpretations of the importance of
automaticity when courts determine the voluntary disclosure of information to a third-party.
Across their varying interpretations of Carpenter, Kerr, Ohm, and Tokson all predicted that the
automatic disclosure of information would tip the scale in favor of finding a search. Interestingly,
Tokson notes that this factor was the most likely of the three Carpenter factors that were most
commonly cited to disfavor finding a search.244 In 38 of the determinative rulings, lower courts
found automatic nature disfavored a search, while only 8 decisions held automaticity favored
one.245 For clarity, though, Tokson explains that when courts assessed the automatic nature in
these cases, they often concluded that disclosure was not automatic and, thus, the Fourth
Amendment could not protect the data.246
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Tokson also examined the Carpenter factors of the inescapable nature of the technology
or surveillance, the cost, and the number of people surveilled, finding each of these factors far
less prevalent in lower court rulings. Lower courts explicitly mentioned the inescapable nature of
the technology or surveillance in 36 cases, 16 of which came to a determinative ruling.247 Tokson
notes that while this Carpenter factor was less frequently discussed in lower court rulings, it was
quite influential for case outcomes.248 In 15 of the 16 cases to cite the inescapability factor, and
reach a determinative yes-or-no ruling, the decision was indicated by the court’s inescapability
factor analysis.249 Tokson highlights that this Carpenter factor was most likely to favor the
government as it led to the finding of a search in only two cases.250 In the case of United States v.
Trader, for example, the 11th Circuit held that the acquisition of a person’s email and IP
addresses from a third party – the phone app Kik – was constitutional even under the Carpenter
analysis.251 The court reasoned that the email addresses and IP addresses at issue did not fall
under the purview of Carpenter, as Trader voluntarily and affirmatively conveyed these pieces of
information to the messaging application from which the government sought information. The
court emphasizes that the defendant had taken no steps to avoid the disclosure of his information,
and, therefore the third-party doctrine governed the case.252 This finding confirms Kerr’s
interpretation that Carpenter only extends to information which is expressly, involuntarily and
automatically conveyed to a third-party.253 Tokson reports that this factor was “to be the most

Tokson, “The Aftermath of Carpenter,” 1823-24.
Tokson, “The Aftermath of Carpenter,” 1823-24.
249
Tokson, “The Aftermath of Carpenter,” 1824.
250
Tokson, “The Aftermath of Carpenter,” 1823.
251
United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2020).
252
Id. at 967.
253
Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” 20.
247
248

65

likely to favor the government when addressed by courts,” much as Kerr anticipated and
recommended.254
The Carpenter factor of the cost of the surveillance was similarly less prevalent, but still
influential when discussed. Tokson notes this factor was mentioned in 34 lower court cases, with
15 of those cases delivering determinative rulings.255 The Carpenter cost factor analysis
indicated how the court would decide a case at a rate of 86.7%, with 13 of the 15 determinative
holdings demonstrating that this factor analysis informed the court’s decision.256 In the
Washington Supreme Court case State v. Muhammad, for example, seven members of the court
held that the pinging of a cell phone to generate real-time CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment
in light of the Carpenter decision.257 The court specifically referenced Chief Justice Roberts’
assertion that CSLI, compared to more traditional surveillance tools, is more inexpensive and
efficient.258 Furthermore, the court emphasized technology’s ability to change the relationship
between the police and citizens when the surveillance is of such a low cost.259 Though Kerr does
not consider this factor in his analysis, and Ohm does so only briefly, Tokson highlights the
privacy harms posed by low-cost surveillance.260 He argues that privacy harms greatly increase
as the cost of surveillance tools decrease, because “cheap and easy” police practices erode the
practical limits that historically confine police powers.261 The influence of this factor, when it
was mentioned, in lower court cases reflects Tokson’s assertion that the cost of surveillance is
important to consider when assessing the harm posed by a technology or surveillance tool.
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Though Tokson demonstrates that the less frequently cited Carpenter factors of
inescapability and cost were still influential when they appeared in court decisions, he
determines that the Carpenter factor of the number of people affected by a surveillance method
has had little influence in resolving Fourth Amendment issues.262 Tokson notes, the “number
factor” was only mentioned in 15 cases, 6 of which delivered a determinative ruling.263
Furthermore, in half of these determinative rulings, the courts plainly rejected the number of
people affected by the technology or surveillance as a factor for determining a search.264 Tokson
concludes that the explicit rejection of the Carpenter factor of the number of people affected by a
technology or surveillance in lower court cases likely indicates the irrelevance of this factor in
post-Carpenter law.
While a few of the Carpenter factors, including the revealing nature of the information,
the amount of data collected, and the automatic nature of disclosure influenced a significant
number of lower court cases following the Supreme Court’s ruling, Tokson’s research affirms his
assertion that the Carpenter opinion did not establish a clear test. Tokson finds that lower courts
have rarely discussed all or even most of the Carpenter factors together, and largely ignored the
Carpenter factors that did not influence the outcome of the case.265 Tokson argues, “this reflects
the absence of a clear doctrinal command regarding the specific standard that courts should
apply,” and “gives courts license to consider all, some, or none of the factors as they see fit.”266
Nevertheless, Tokson notes that overtime this flexibility and ambiguity have allowed lower
courts to define a “relatively clear,” emerging Carpenter test for Fourth Amendment searches.267
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Based on their prevalence and influence, Tokson asserts that the emerging Carpenter test
consists of at least three factors: “the revealing nature of the data captured, the amount of data
captured, and whether the data was disclosed to a third party automatically.”268 Additionally,
Tokson finds that these three factors are themselves strongly correlated – especially between
revealing nature and amount – and with case outcomes in lower courts. 269 The impact of these
factors in lower court decisions, as well as their correlation in determining outcomes indicates
further that these factors make up the prevailing Carpenter framework. Tokson emphasizes the
impact of these combined factors in post-Carpenter Fourth Amendment cases: “In cases where
the government obtains a substantial amount of revealing data that was collected automatically
from a user, courts will very likely find a search.”270 Conversely, when the government obtains a
small amount of non-revealing data from a third-party that a user voluntarily discloses
information to, Tokson concludes, no search will be found.
Though Tokson, and other scholars, anticipated the inescapability of a technology or
surveillance as well as its cost to be influential in lower court cases post-Carpenter, Tokson finds
that courts have yet to incorporate these factors into a consistently applied test.271 As for the
factor of the number of people affected by a technology, Tokson concludes this factor largely
does not matter for case outcomes.272 Ultimately, Tokson notes that, while the lower courts have
largely indicated the Carpenter test consists of an analysis of the nature, amount, and voluntary
disclosure of the information, the persistent inconsistency of lower court decisions leaves open
the possibility for other factors, such as cost, to be incorporated, or for courts to combine factors
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in the future.273 Lower courts thus far have clarified the jurisprudential changes of Carpenter v.
United States by beginning to formulate the new multi-factor Carpenter test, but a consistently
applicable Carpenter framework remains undeveloped.274 As I will explain in a later section, part
of this inconsistency rests in the Carpenter amount factor, which will require clarification for
consistent applicability of the Carpenter framework in Fourth Amendment cases.
In addition to exploring the development of the Carpenter factor analysis in lower courts,
Tokson’s study also examines two key arguments made by prominent scholars, Kerr and Ohm.
He first looks at Orin Kerr’s suggestion that Carpenter established a factor which Tokson calls
the “the digital-age technology factor.”275 In his analysis of the Carpenter opinion, Orin Kerr
suggests that the Carpenter framework is limited to modes of surveillance and technologies
novel in the digital age.276 In other words, Kerr posits that Carpenter does not apply to traditional
types of surveillance or their digital equivalents. Kerr emphasizes that the Court found CSLI to
be “an entirely different species” of data, leaving existing precedent unbothered.277 He also
stresses that the majority claimed Carpenter did not “call into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools.”278
In his study, Tokson weighs Kerr’s claim against lower court rulings. He concludes that
Kerr’s assertion is overstated: “There is little evidence in the dataset that courts consider digital
age technology a requirement for Fourth Amendment protection under Carpenter.”279 In fact,
Tokson found that only one case in the entire dataset presented digital nature as a factor worth
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considering.280 Furthermore, Tokson notes that several post-Carpenter cases extended Fourth
Amendment protection to data derived from pre-digital age surveillance tools and their
equivalents,281 precisely what Kerr argued would not happen. In the case of People v. Tafoya, for
example, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the government’s use of a pole camera to
monitor the property around a suspect’s home for three-months was an unconstitutional
search.282 In September of 2021, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeals.283 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado explicitly references Carpenter’s
precedent as a guide: “Together, Jones and Carpenter suggest that when government conduct
involves continuous, long-term surveillance, it implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Put simply, the duration, continuity, and nature of surveillance matter when considering all the
facts and circumstances in a particular case.”284 Tokson notes that this case disproves Kerr’s
suggestion that the Carpenter framework does not apply to pre-digital age surveillance tools and
technologies. Additionally, in 2020, the Ohio Court of Appeals extended Fourth Amendment
protection to blood and urine samples taken for emergency medical purposes.285 In its analysis,
this court explicitly relied on Carpenter, stating the Supreme Court’s precedent established a test
for assessing the intimate nature of the information sought and the extent of voluntary
disclosure.286 Here, the court applied an interpretation of the Carpenter framework to a
traditional practice, without any consideration for Kerr’s digital-age technology factor.
While Tokson concludes that Kerr's digital-age technology factor has not been adopted as
one of the Carpenter test factors in lower court analyses, he does find support for a more
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nuanced and “subtle relationship” between the digital-age factor and lower court case
outcomes.287 Tokson notes that, of the 217 determinative lower court rulings in the data set, 159
involved digital-age information, such as CSLI and IP addresses.288 The other 58 cases that
reached a determinative ruling addressed pre-digital age information or its equivalents.289 Of the
cases that addressed digital-age data, courts found a search in 57 cases.290 On the other hand,
among the cases involving pre-digital age data, courts found a search in only 9.291 Tokson’s
analysis reveals that cases involving data of the digital age found a search at a rate of 35.8%,
while cases involving pre-digital age data, found a search at a rate of 15.5%.292 Therefore, courts
are more likely to find a search in cases involving technologies and tools of the digital age rather
than traditional types of data and surveillance techniques.293 Even though lower courts do not
explicitly refer to the modern nature of the data or surveillance technique, this factor does seem
to correlate significantly with rulings of a search. Tokson concludes: “Lower courts have not
adopted an interpretation of Carpenter that would limit its protection exclusively to digital data.
But digital data is more likely to be protected than non-digital data in cases applying
Carpenter.”294 So, while Kerr interprets Carpenter’s scope to be narrow, limited to technologies
and surveillance tools novel in the digital age, post-Carpenter litigation demonstrates the
Carpenter framework is broader than Kerr expected. The Carpenter test has changed Fourth
Amendment rules for new technologies, and, in many cases, old ones too.
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Tokson also discusses the merit of Kerr and Ohm’s argument that the Court in Carpenter
reshaped the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. While Ohm argues this point more
forcefully than Kerr does, both scholars suggest that the emerging Carpenter test changed Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by eroding the prior Katz framework. Kerr argues that the traditional
Katz test was reshaped from an analysis of the places and things in which people are entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy, to an analysis of how much the government can learn about us
by obtaining our information, regardless of the source.295 Ohm suggests that Carpenter
reinvented the Katz test with its multi-factor test and potential rules of technological
equivalence.296 Rather than gauge societal expectations of privacy, Ohm suggests that the Court
in Carpenter adopted a normative role,297 as it assessed the privacy risks posed by not only the
state of CSLI in the present but also that of the future.298
Through Tokson’s analysis of lower court decisions, he finds Kerr and Ohm’s assertions
that the Katz test was reshaped or replaced in Carpenter are largely unsubstantiated. First,
Tokson notes that 88 determinative lower court rulings did not mention the Carpenter factors.299
While Tokson explains that many of these cases refrained from discussing Carpenter factors
because the data in question was either analogous to the CSLI in Carpenter, or involved a Fourth
Amendment issue affirmed in Carpenter, several of these cases were simply resolved under the
Court’s long-standing Katz framework.300 Moreover, even in the cases which did analyze Fourth
Amendment claims using the Carpenter factors, most courts referred to the Katz test and
discussed the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy.301 For example, in two cases discussed
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above, People v, Tafoya and State v. Eads, these courts applied Carpenter factor analyses, yet
also extensively referenced the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy approach. Tokson
concludes: “there is no indication that Carpenter has misplaced or usurped Katz as the primary
framework of Fourth Amendment search law, as some commentators predicted. Rather,
Carpenter has augmented or modified the Katz inquiry while leaving its general framework in
place.”302
Nevertheless, Tokson’s study demonstrates that Carpenter’s impact on lower court
Fourth Amendment cases has been immense. Not only have courts increasingly adhered to
Carpenter’s narrowing of the third-party doctrine, but they have widely accepted parts of the
Carpenter factor framework introduced by the Supreme Court in 2018. Lower courts have begun
to develop an emerging Carpenter test, which consists of the revealing nature of the information,
the amount, and the voluntary nature of disclosure, while keeping intact the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test. Looking forward, though, Tokson asserts that further clarity of this
test is needed.303 He reiterates that many lower courts consider a select number of Carpenter
factors, relevant to the decision, while ignoring the other factors from the Court’s decision.304
“The time has come for courts to abandon this practice,” Tokson writes.305 Instead, he argues
courts should develop a consistent set of factors, even if these factor tests vary across
jurisdictions.306 Tokson concludes that this clarification would allow for more coherent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the wake of Carpenter, and significantly more predictability. In my
next section I will explore a key route by which lower courts and, eventually the Supreme Court,
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can and should solidify the Carpenter amount factor in Fourth Amendment doctrine to build on
the progress of lower courts in developing the law after Carpenter.

The Mosaic Theory post-Carpenter

As I have discussed throughout this thesis, the mosaic theory has lingered in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since before its endorsement by five Supreme Court justices in United
States v. Jones.307 The mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment states that a collection
of information obtained by the government may implicate privacy concerns greater than those of
each individual piece of information. In other words, individuals have a greater privacy interest
in collections of their data, as opposed to isolated pieces of information. As Orin Kerr explains,
“the mosaic theory is therefore premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of
nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection and subsequent
analysis creates a revealing mosaic.”308 Scholars have suggested that the Court in Carpenter
possibly endorsed the mosaic theory. In considering the amount of data obtained in Carpenter,
the Court determined that 127 days of CSLI was a search but asserted less than seven days of
CSLI collection was not.309 As one scholar argues, had the Court used the traditional sequential
approach in Carpenter, assessing each government action in isolation, the issue of duration in
Carpenter would have been immaterial.310 So, while the Court did not explicitly endorse the
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mosaic theory approach in Carpenter, it did “at least open the door” for lower courts to either
accept or reject this holistic approach.311
Lower court rulings since Carpenter affirm this insight. First, the adoption of the mosaic
theory by lower courts is evident in the Carpenter test that has emerged. As Tokson highlights,
the amount of data collected in lower court cases was the most prevalent Carpenter factor,
mentioned in 116 total decisions in the dataset.312 Lower courts citing Carpenter largely adhered
to the Carpenter principle, which built on the Jones concurrences, that privacy harms generally
tend to increase as the amount of data collected increases.313 In the case of People v, Tafoya, the
Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the effect of the continuity and duration of the surveillance
on Tafoya’s reasonable expectation of privacy.314 The court referenced Justice Alito’s argument
in Jones that people generally expect there to be practical limits on police power precluding
constant, infallible, and long-term tracking.315 The court found that this expectation applied to
the surveillance here, too. The court reasoned that three months of “continuous” pole camera
surveillance, examining the curtilage of Tafoya’s home, fell outside the scope of what society
expects of law enforcement.316 Additionally, the court held that the government gathered a
similarly “precise” and “comprehensive” record to those in Jones and Carpenter.317 In another
case, Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, involving historical CSLI, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts ruled that the government’s collection of more than six hours of CSLI amounted
to a search.318 In the opinion, the court specifically addressed the constitutional concerns raised
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by the collection of “extended” CSLI,319 and explained that the amount of data was particularly
pertinent to the determination in the case. Here, too, the court displayed a clear application of the
mosaic theory framework.320
Additionally, in lower court cases which ultimately did not find a search, several courts
justified their rulings using the mosaic theory framework. In the case People v. Edwards, for
example, the Bronx Supreme Court determined that the government’s use of only two days of
historical CSLI did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.321 In this case, the court
differentiated the short-term CSLI from the extensive data in Carpenter, arguing that two days’
worth of this location information was targeted and specific enough that it did reveal intimate
details in the way long-term surveillance does. “The difference between long-term and shortterm CSLI data is stark,” the court reasoned, because “long-term data can be likened to filming a
person's entire life for weeks, or months, or even years; short-term CSLI data is like taking a
single snapshot of that person on the street.”322 Here, the court employed the mosaic theory
approach to determine that Carpenter did not cover short-term CSLI, explaining that the privacy
harms posed by only two days of data collection did not equate to the harms posed in Carpenter.
As Tokson’s comprehensive study highlights, and lower court rulings corroborate, the amount of
information collected by the government has been a significant factor in many lower court
decisions since Carpenter.323 The mosaic theory has allowed many lower courts to further
develop Carpenter’s factor test and remain loyal to the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need to
evaluate the amount of surveillance collected.

319

Id. at 767.
Fairbanks, 76.
321
People v. Edwards, 63 Misc. 3d 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)
322
Id. at 832.
323
Tokson, “The Aftermath of Carpenter,” 1823.
320

76

Still, the mosaic theory is not binding Fourth Amendment law.324 Since the Court did not
explicitly endorse the mosaic theory in Carpenter, it failed to provide clear guidance for lower
courts going forward. While some courts have applied the mosaic theory, other have not. For
example, in the case of People v. Simpson, a Supreme Court in New York ignored the amount
factor of CSLI collection.325 Here, the court argued that the Carpenter opinion focused more on
the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s physical movements learned through
any CSLI, in effect working around the question of surveillance duration.326 Other courts have
gone a step further to attack the mosaic theory approach explicitly. In the controversial case of
United States v. Tuggle, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
government’s long-term pole camera surveillance of the outside of Tuggle’s home and his
surrounding property.327 While Tuggle moved to suppress the eighteen months of pole camera
surveillance, he failed to convince the court that a Fourth Amendment search occurred. Tuggle
asserted that, even if the court found short-term pole camera surveillance was permissible under
Carpenter, it should recognize that the extensive surveillance at issue in the case was more
invasive than a small collection of pole camera surveillance, and thus constituted a search.328
However, the court declined to apply the mosaic theory, arguing that the information conveyed
by the pole-cameras outside of Tuggle’s home did not implicate the privacy concerns of the
extensive tracking in Jones or Carpenter, which tracked location information across private and
public spaces, and did so retrospectively.329 Here, the Seventh Circuit explained that the mosaic
theory has an “obvious line-drawing problem.”330 Furthermore, if the court were to draw a line, it
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“risks violating Supreme Court precedent and interfering with Congress's policy-making
function.”331 In United States v. Tuggle, the Seventh Circuit went even beyond declining to apply
the mosaic theory approach to the facts of the case and also rejected the mosaic theory as a viable
Fourth Amendment framework. While the Supreme Court’s ambiguous attitude towards the
mosaic theory in Carpenter has led some lower courts to adopt the framework, and many to at
least discuss the factor of the amount of information in their decisions,332 it has also left room for
explicit rejection and criticism by lower courts. Crucially, these varying interpretations have led
to contradictory conclusions in Fourth Amendment law. While the Supreme Court of Colorado
held in People v. Tafoya that three months of pole-camera surveillance was a search, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Tuggle ruled that eighteen months of the same surveillance was not.
Surely, the justices on the Supreme Court, and the framers of the Fourth Amendment for that
matter, did not intend for two lower courts to arrive at opposite conclusions when applying
Fourth Amendment precedent. So, the question remains, what to do with the mosaic theory.

The Future of the Mosaic Theory
Orin Kerr has long denounced the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment.333
Most notably, Kerr criticizes the theory for requiring “arbitrary and likely endless linedrawing,”334 as Judge Flaum echoed in his opinion in United States v. Tuggle.335 Kerr suggests
that the theory raises never-ending questions about how much surveillance amounts to an
intimate mosaic, what types of surveillance can qualify under the theory, and whether continuous
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long-term surveillance means that there can be no period of time during the surveillance in which
the device is either dormant or not in use.336 Furthermore, Kerr suggests that even if judges took
on the burden of answering these questions, they would likely fail in their efforts.337
Kerr suggests that the mosaic theory is “well intentioned.”338 It is premised on
equilibrium adjustment, as it attempts to regulate emerging police powers made possible by
digital age technology, but Kerr asserts this theory does not bode well in the quickly evolving
age of “computerization.”339
The challenge of answering the questions raised by the mosaic theory has particular force
because the theory attempts to regulate use of changing technologies… As a result, the
constantly evolving nature of surveillance practices can lead new questions to arise faster
than courts might settle them. Old practices would likely be obsolete by the time the
courts resolved how to address them, and the newest surveillance practices would arrive
and their legality would be unknown.340
Instead of adopting the mosaic theory, Kerr has long endorsed the traditional “sequential”
approach to the Fourth Amendment.341 The sequential approach instructs that each police action
be analyzed in isolation to determine when and if at a certain point a search occurred. For
example, in United States v. Jones, the majority opinion employed the sequential approach to
find a search occurred.342 Under the trespass doctrine, Jones’ Fourth Amendment right was
violated the moment the government affixed the GPS tracking device to his vehicle.343 Kerr
argues, compared to the complexity of searches under the mosaic theory, searches under the
sequential approach are “simple points.”344
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Though a majority of the Court in Carpenter endorsed the mosaic theory approach to the
Fourth Amendment, Kerr has remained committed to the sequential approach. Following
Carpenter, he simply created a digital-age analogue to the sequential approach, which he calls
the “Source Rule.”345 As an extension of Kerr’s purported Carpenter test, the source rule
provides Fourth Amendment protection to any and all information derived from a Carpenter
technology or surveillance technique.346 Kerr states, “As long as the information reveals some
fact about that person’s records derived from the regulated technology, the revealing of
information should count as a search. One datum is just as protected as the entire database. It's all
protected.” 347 While Kerr argues that the Source Rule approach is overly inclusive,348 as small
amounts of surveillance would constitute a Fourth Amendment search, this approach raises
concerns far greater than being too protective.
Under the guidance of the Kerr’s Source Rule, information collected from databases and
technologies that fail to meet Kerr’s Carpenter test criteria will not be protected. As he explains
in his analysis of Carpenter, “Pre-digital records and their modern equivalents are exempt, sort
of like a constitutional grandfather clause. Only new kinds of records that the digital age has
enabled can trigger the new search doctrine.”349 Given the vast breadth of technologies and
surveillance techniques that are still being litigated post-Carpenter, the Source Rule is actually
under-inclusive. Under Kerr’s strict approach, pole camera surveillance, for example, receives no
protection under the Carpenter framework. Regardless of the revealing nature of the footage, or
the length of time one’s home may be surveilled, the Source Rule says warrantless pole camera
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surveillance is permissible. This clearly contradicts the spirit and language of the majority
opinion in Carpenter.
As Tokson notes, lower court rulings that declined to find that continuous pole-camera
surveillance constitutes a search often reach this conclusion because they assert there is not a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior or surroundings of one home which are exposed
to the public.350 In United States v. Tuggle for example, the Seventh Circuit court held that
Tuggle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy outside of his house or in the area
around it, because he had not attempted to shield this area from the public and, thus, he
knowingly exposed these areas to public view.351 Tokson argues this reasoning was rejected by
the court in Carpenter. “The Court emphasized that mere exposure of something to third parties
will not necessarily render it unprotected by the Fourth Amendment,” Tokson explains.352
“When a surveillance practice is especially invasive, comprehensive, and/or inescapable, it may
be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether the information it captures might,
in theory, be observed by others.”353 Given the Court’s rejection of a strict application of the
third-party doctrine in Carpenter, finding disclosure does not always eliminate Fourth
Amendment protection. As a result, Tokson explains that a similar argument must apply to pole
cameras. Under the guidance of Carpenter, the fact that one exposes the outside of their home or
curtilage to onlookers does not suffice to eliminate Fourth Amendment protection in the constant
tracking of this area. Additionally, Tokson notes that Carpenter’s emphasis on the invasive
nature of continuous CSLI applies to continuous pole camera surveillance.354 While courts may
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try to distinguish pole camera surveillance from the types of information in Jones and
Carpenter,355 there are no grounds for such a distinction. In the same way the Court found that
continuous CSLI tracking creates “a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled
every day, every moment, over several years,”356 long-term pole camera surveillance has the
capacity to do the same. In People v. Tafoya, one court argued that “pole camera surveillance
shares many of the troubling attributes of GPS tracking…[and] this record ‘reflects a wealth of
detail’ about him and his associations.”357 Carpenter extends to pole camera surveillance. This
type of information has the capacity to reveal explicit, intimate details when aggregated over a
period of time. If Kerr’s Source Rule were to be adopted, the privacy harms posed by pole
camera surveillance would go unchecked, as this technology is not a product of the digital age.
Thus, the Source Rule must be rejected. The mosaic theory must be accepted instead.
The case for the mosaic theory is stronger than its alternative and outweighs its
drawbacks. While the Source Rule ostensibly has the virtue of clarity, this functions more like
expediency. The Source Rule creates broad definitive rules for new technologies which Kerr
suggests deserve Carpenter protection, while leaving unprotected data derived from non-digital
age sources. This approach trades crucial analyses of our privacy interests, which grow more
compelling as the amount of surveillance collected does, for easily applicable, overinclusive, and
underinclusive rules. Our Fourth Amendment rights, especially in the rapidly evolving digital
age, should not be protected through the whichever approach is most straight-forward. Rather,
they should be protected through a framework that is adaptable and responsive to real and
emerging privacy harms. The mosaic theory is that framework even if the application of the
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theory will require courts to partake in line-drawing. As discussed above, lower court
disagreements over the framework demonstrates the complexity of this practice. But, as Tokson
notes, line-drawing is required in all areas of the law.358 Furthermore, he asserts that lower courts
seem “perfectly capable of distinguishing between different durations or quantities of
surveillance.”359 Indeed, a more explicit endorsement of the mosaic theory would not upend
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as Kerr implies. Tokson’s study demonstrates that lower
courts widely accept the guidance from Carpenter that the amount of information obtained is a
constitutionally relevant factor.360 Thus, courts across the country already have experience with
the mosaic theory, whether that phrase has appeared in their decisions or not.
Additionally, the mosaic theory fits neatly into the existing Katz framework, as courts
have demonstrated. When determining whether a search has occurred, courts have examined
whether the duration of a surveillance violates a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the
intimate details that aggregated information has the tendency to reveal.361 Additionally, the
Supreme Court and various lower courts have adopted Justice Alito’s analysis from his Jones
concurrence that reasonable expectations of privacy are intertwined with what people believe law
enforcement has the power to do. The longer, more continuous, and more invasive a surveillance
is, the more likely it is to violate our reasonable expectation of privacy for both reasons.362
Courts with experience assessing duration as a consideration in a Katz analysis will have no
trouble adopting a clearer mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment.
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Beyond the practicality argument for embracing this Fourth Amendment approach, there
are other compelling reasons the Supreme Court should invoke a stronger version of the mosaic
theory. First, as Professor Paul Rosenzweig argues in his defense of the mosaic theory, the theory
is “scientifically accurate.”363 In the digital age, data aggregations are unequivocally more
valuable than pieces of data in isolation. Rosenzweig notes, “large data aggregation are how the
government tracks potential terrorists who travel internationally, and it is how Google knows
what ads to serve you.”364 In other words, reality demonstrates that more information is learned
when more data is collected. The law, Rosenzweig argues, ought to reflect this.365 Rosenzweig
supports this normative claim by arguing that the Supreme Court has previously decided cases
with at least the partial goal of “accommodating technological reality.”366 Arguably, the Court
has decided each landmark digital Fourth Amendment case since Katz with technological reality
in mind, and in few, namely Kyllo and Carpenter, with the technological reality of the future in
mind as well. Rosenzweig claims that the Court must adapt to the reality of the large-scale data
collection made possible by the digital age, and the mosaic theory provides the best framework
for doing so.
Lastly, as Kerr himself notes, the mosaic theory is premised on equilibrium
adjustment.367 While Kerr argues the theory is a misguided approach to equilibrium
adjustment,368 other scholars commend this approach for its relevance in the digital age. As
Rosenzweig argues, the theory’s consistency with technological reality is powerful. The mosaic
theory gives courts a framework to address how long-term surveillance violates privacy in ways
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that smaller-scale surveillance simply cannot. Courts can then expand Fourth Amendment
protections or refine them based on the surveillance method’s ability to violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Surely, the mosaic theory is not a bright-line rule, but its flexibility is a
virtue. Short-term CSLI should not be a search. The Supreme Court has agreed,369 and so do
lower courts.370 But only the mosaic theory enables courts to determine that longer-term CSLI
collection has the power to erode privacy protections in a unique way. Data collections create
mosaics of peoples’ routines, relationships, and deeply personal activities. In the digital age, the
amount of data the government can collect is constitutionally salient. No framework other than
the mosaic theory suffices to safeguard the unique privacy harms of the modern digital era.
While this thesis does not aim to defend against every aspect of the mosaic theory’s
approach to the Fourth Amendment, it does suggest the mosaic theory is the most defensible
framework under which courts should address modern Fourth Amendment issues. The theory’s
compatibility with both the emerging Carpenter test in lower courts and the long-standing Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine indicate that an explicit endorsement would fit
seamlessly into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Furthermore, the mosaic theory’s roots of
equilibrium adjustment make it the most attractive approach for the Fourth Amendment in the
digital age, as its flexibility allows for constant adaptation when necessary.
As lower courts continue to develop the law after Carpenter, referencing the intimacy of
the information and the amount collected in some cases, but ignoring them in others, it seems
plausible that the mosaic theory will continue to receive inconsistent application. Ultimately, the
Court may soon be faced with a Fourth Amendment question that requires a stronger
endorsement of the mosaic theory. It is in the best interest of Carpenter’s legitimacy and, most
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importantly, Fourth Amendment rights themselves, that the Court holds decisively that the
mosaic theory framework should inform jurisprudence in the digital age.

Conclusion
In this thesis I have discussed the Supreme Court’s most influential Fourth Amendment
cases from the early 18th century through its most recent landmark decision in 2018. I have
explored how the Court reshaped Fourth Amendment doctrine from a traditional property-based
approach, first developed in Olmstead, to a reasonable expectation of privacy test, established in
Katz. I then examined how the Supreme Court has incorporated new Fourth Amendment rules to
address emerging technologies in the digital age. Namely, in the case of United States v. Jones,
the majority rooted its decision in the traditional trespass-doctrine, but a five-justice majority
joined concurring opinions that endorsed a Fourth Amendment approach which addresses how
the amount of surveillance changes our reasonable expectations of privacy. This approach, called
the mosaic theory, has become a critical aspect of Fourth Amendment law in the era of modern
technology, and I dedicate the end of my third chapter to defending the merits of this framework.
Additionally, my first chapter discusses the Supreme Court’s creation of the third-party doctrine,
as it played a crucial role in Carpenter v. United States, where it was eventually narrowed by the
Court.
Throughout this thesis, I reference leading Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr’s
poignant observation that the Supreme Court has consistently engaged in a practice called
equilibrium adjustment when administering the Fourth Amendment. As new technologies and
law enforcement practices develop, upsetting the prior balance between citizens and the
government, equilibrium adjustment moves the Court to reshape Fourth Amendment protections
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to restore this balance. Equilibrium adjustment is particularly necessary in the digital age. The
Court in Riley expressed this view, when it found that the search of a cellphone was uniquely
distinct from any other category of personal belongings, specifically that it was incomparable
to the search of a person’s wallet. The Chief Justice recognized the power of modern technology
to reframe expectations of privacy and necessitate enhanced Fourth Amendment protections, and
the Court responded accordingly. This exercise of equilibrium adjustment continued through the
Court’s next, and most recent decision, Carpenter v. United States.
The second chapter of this paper closely examines Carpenter v. United States, where the
Court held that the third-party doctrine could not apply to the long-term acquisition of a person's
historical cell site location information. I discuss the key arguments of Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion, specifically his assertion that extensive CSLI collection has the power, much like GPS
data, to reveal intimate and private details of one’s life. This chapter also breaks down Orin Kerr
and Paul Ohm’s interpretations of this decision, finding disagreements in the doctrinal shifts
initiated by the decision and the Carpenter test established. These scholars do, however, agree
that the Supreme Court in Carpenter possibly endorsed the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth
Amendment. These scholars argue that the Court’s emphasis on the extensive nature of the CSLI
collection in Carpenter, and the Chief Justice’s reliance on the Jones concurrences, indicate the
Court may have used the mosaic theory to reach its decision. Both Kerr and Ohm argue that this
theory should be rejected for its difficult administrability, while Tokson indicates support for
courts’ consideration of the amount of data collected.
Finally, the third chapter of this paper examined how lower courts have interpreted
Carpenter. This chapter compares the interpretations of Fourth Amendment scholars, described
in the second chapter, to Matthew Tokson’s comprehensive empirical study of Carpenter’s
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impact in Fourth Amendment law. Tokson finds that lower courts have not only largely complied
with the Carpenter decision, but also effectively developed and refined the recent doctrinal shift.
Tokson’s research also points to the conclusion that lower courts have revealed an emerging
Carpenter test, in which the nature of the data, the amount gathered, and the automatic nature of
disclosure all significantly influence decisions applying the Carpenter rationale. Tokson notes
that, while this emerging test brings some clarity to the Carpenter shift, the Supreme Court needs
to provide lower courts with a clearer, more consistent multi-factor test they can apply to all
Fourth Amendment cases in the future.
The third chapter also explores Carpenter’s endorsement of the mosaic theory approach
to the Fourth Amendment. I consider both adoption and rejection of this framework in lower
court decisions since Carpenter, and ultimately argue that this theory provides an effective way
for courts to determine Fourth Amendment searches. The mosaic theory is flawed. This thesis
does not attempt to resolve all of its issues, but it does articulate why, particularly in the digital
age, acceptance of this approach is the most desirable choice for consistency with doctrinal
developments and loyalty to the long-standing tradition of equilibrium adjustment.
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